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INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to argue with the concept that race and gender should
play no part in employment and education opportunities, but only if one
were to ignore the extent to which those factors have played an extensive
role in our past history. When I was appointed to the United States
District Court in 1979, I was assigned the discrimination cases against
the police and fire departments for all of New Jersey's major cities.
These were cities in which minorities represented a majority of the
population, with little, and in some cases no, representation among
firefighters or police officers. Although far from perfect, steps to
prevent future recurrence of invidious discrimination were easier to

conceive than those that would remedy for the past. The specific means
chosen to remedy past discrimination of such magnitude might be
subject to challenge; but, in reality and fairness, some form of
affirmative action was necessary to cure the past wrongs. The debate
has bogged down over discussions of "quotas" and "goals," but
arguments over the form of relief never overcame its necessity. Indeed,
all of those cases were resolved by consent orders because everyone
involved recognized both the need and the wisdom of affirmative action
as a preventative measure for the future and an attempt, albeit imperfect,
to cure past discrimination.
There are legitimate and understandable objections to affirmative
action. Most forms of social engineering are spread over the populace
by taxes or other forms of government action that attempt to apportion
the burden in some rational way. But affirmative action is unique in that
its implementation affects, or is perceived to affect, identifiable
individuals, many of whom never committed an act of discrimination
and are not responsible for those who have suffered from it. Every time
someone is preferred for employment, promotion, or acceptance at an
educational institution, someone else is deprived of that opportunity. It
is difficult to explain to the police officer who is about to make sergeant
that someone else lower down on the list will receive "his" promotion.
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It can be argued that he has been the beneficiary of the discriminatory
system, that minority persons are not "qualified" for the position simply
because they have been denied opportunities under the system, or that
the criteria and qualifications themselves are discriminatory. However,
none of these arguments alleviates the anger and frustration of the
persons adversely affected. The nonminority police officer cannot
understand why he should be denied what he would otherwise receive in
order to achieve some larger social good.
We delude ourselves if we do not admit and recognize that some of
the resentment toward affirmative action has underpinnings of racial and
gender prejudice. No referenda are proposed to bar athletic scholarships
or geographic considerations in connection with admissions to
educational institutions, even though those actions clearly deprive
someone (more objectively qualified) from those positions. True, those
actions are not predicated upon race or gender, nor are they of

constitutional magnitude; but the consequences to others are the same,
and we accept them without complaint. Apparently having a good
football team is considered more important than promoting racial
diversity on campus.
There is also the argument made by respected scholars that affirmative
action demeans and stigmatizes those who benefit by it. A beneficiary
may suffer doubts and others may always suspect that the person is
unqualified or unworthy of the opportunity received. Those are real and
understandable concerns, but given the choice between receiving the
employment or educational opportunity with those possible side effects
and not receiving it at all, the benefits would seem to outweigh the
potential detriments.
It is ironic that the opposition to affirmative action is predicated upon
the lofty principle that there should be no race-conscious or genderconscious remedies. To bar affirmative action is to ignore reality and
the past. The difference lies in whether we merely lift our heel off of the
backs of minorities and women and say henceforth you will be treated
equally, or reach down and lift them up to make amends for our past
treatment. The former makes equality a goal of the next millennium; the
latter makes it achievable in this one. Affirmative action is not only
principled, it is practical. Indeed, our goal should be a time when
affirmative action is no longer necessary. But the racial divide seems to

be widening, particularly for African-Americans.' If we cannot bring
ourselves to recognize that we owe such action in keeping with the
highest traditions of our democracy, let us, at least, recognize it as a,
necessity, so that a large segment of our population will not remain
uneducated, unemployed, in poverty, and with no place to turn but
crime. If principles do not carry the day, practicalities might.
First, this Article argues that affirmative action is right and necessary
in certain circumstances. Second, it examines whether affirmative
action has survived under current case law. Part II.A reviews the
Supreme Court decisions that define the test of strict scrutiny in the
public employment context. Part II.B discusses the current focus of the
Court's debate on affirmative action. Part III looks at how strict scrutiny
analysis and the Supreme Court's precedents are being applied by the
lower federal courts. Part IV concludes that more guidance is needed
from the Supreme Court on the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis
as to when a compelling government interest exists. Last, this Article
suggests that the Supreme Court firmly establish an "inferential
standard" for proving past discrimination by a public employer sufficient

to warrant current affirmative action.
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE EVOLUTION
AND AFTERMATH OF STRICT SCRUTINY
Throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has grappled
with many of the issues described above. The contrasting and often
conflicting considerations are reflected in the difficulty the Court has
had in providing guidance. The Court has rarely delivered an opinion
supported by a majority, much less reached a consensus. There has been
a constant tension between the need to effect change for the whole of
society and the need to protect each individual member of that society.
While recognizing a historic need to advance the constitutionally
protected equality interest of minorities toward fulfillment, the Court has
been reluctant to impose the burden of society's past mistakes on any
given individual. Although continually acknowledging that, in a perfect
world, society, and especially government, would take a color-blind
view of all people, the Court has been less consistent in establishing the
means for achieving perfection.
One of the major obstacles the Court has faced is trying to set forth
prospective bright-line rules in a retrospective, yet ever-changing
1.

See generally Text of 'Affirmative Action Review' Report to President Clinton

Released July 19, 1995, Daily Lab. Rep. Special Supp. No. 139 d30 (July 19, 1995)
(citing to empirical studies that detail racial discrimination and inequality in American
society).
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society-orders to stop current discrimination are easy. But the line
becomes blurred when a multiplicity of past, present, and future
influences intersect-when discrimination imposed for decades in
education, hiring, and promotion is necessarily perpetuated by merely
maintaining the status quo.
In many cases, the Court has found itself reacting to the unintended,
perhaps unforeseen consequences of attempts to remedy discrimination,
such as the detriments to its beneficiaries, as previously discussed. In
Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,2 for example, Justice

Powell suggested that programs designed to help minorities may actually
backfire by "reinforc[ing] common stereotypes holding that certain
groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on
a factor having no relationship to individual
worth." Similar concerns
4
were echoed in Fullilove v. Klutznick:

[E]ven though it is not the actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of this
kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who
are granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is
identified purely by their race. Because that perception--especially when
fostered by the Congress of the United States-can only exacerbate rather than
reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the5 time when race will become a truly
irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor.

Determining when affirmative action6 is or should be constitutionally
2.

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

In Bakke, a white male candidate for admission to

medical school at the University of California at Davis charged violations of the Equal
Protection Clause because he was ineligible to compete for 16 seats in the entering class
on the basis of his race. See id. at 277-79. The Court held that the admissions program
was unconstitutional. See id. at 271.
3. Id. at 298 (Powell, J., concurring).
4. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Court in Fullilove upheld a 10% minority business
enterprise set-aside in deference to the legislative determinations of Congress. See id. at
492. Such deference would not pass the test of time, as later held in Adarand
Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) ("Federal racial classifications, like
those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly
tailored to further that interest.... ["1o the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal
racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer
controlling.").
5. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
6. As discussed in this Article, "affirmative action" refers generally to initiatives
designed to promote equality between racial and ethnic groups. Affirmative action can
be race-neutral or race-conscious. Typical race-neutral affirmative action programs
include outreach and recruiting efforts. A common race-conscious affirmative action
plan in public employment is the use of goals for promotion and hiring decisions. For
example, an employer may set a goal of 25% minority composition of its workforce and
establish an alternative hiring policy, where one minority employee is hired for each

permitted has become a critical issue for the Court. The broadest view,

that racially preferential policies should be permitted to compensate for
the past, present, and continuing effects of discrimination generally by a
white majority against a black minority-so called "societal

discrimination"--has largely been discarded.7

Although government

policy should rightfully be concerned with past discrimination by society
as a whole, in the remedial sense, such discrimination has been viewed

as too "amorphous [a] concept of injury" for courts to address.8 The

concept of minority and majority are temporary, reflecting political as
well as demographic circumstances, while the concept of equal
protection of the law should be timeless, enduring, and irrespective of
which race constitutes the minority. 9 As a corollary, the related

argument that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to those who
have been identified as "discrete and insular'

minorities subject to

historical discrimination has also been discarded."
Yet the Court has similarly rejected the narrowest reading of the

Constitution's Equal Protection guarantee as dictating an entirely colorblind society.

The Court continues to recognize that this is no less true

today than it was more than twenty years ago. The "claims that law
must be 'color-blind' or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to

public policy
must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of
3
reality. '
Somewhere in the middle, the Supreme Court has recognized an arena
it considers appropriate for affirmative action. Amidst differing
opinions as to the precise boundaries, the Court has settled on defining
nonminority who is hired, until the 25% goal is reached. Only race-conscious
affirmative action is subject to strict scrutiny. See Allen v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
164 F.3d 1347, 1352 (1lth Cir. 1999) ("[W]here the government does not exclude

persons from benefits based on race, but chooses to undertake outreach efforts to persons

of one race, broadening the pool of applicants, but disadvantaging no one, strict scrutiny
is generally inapplicable.").
7. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality
opinion) ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing
a racially classified remedy.").
8. Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
9. See id. at 295.
10. United States v. CaroleneProductsCo., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
11. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. Justice Powell argued in Bakke that "[t]he
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the
same protection, then it is not equal." Id.
12. See id. at 336 (plurality opinion) ("[N]o decision of this Court has ever adopted
the proposition that the Constitution must be colorblind."); see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (stating that strict scrutiny does not
automatically invalidate all race-based government action).
13. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (plurality opinion); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 272
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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this arena by applying strict scrutiny to all race-conscious affirmative
action plans. As a result, the Court now requires that any affirmative
action plan by a state actor be supported by a compelling government
interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
In the employment context, the Court has been presented both with
cases clearly exemplifying compelling interests and with those clearly
falling outside the bounds, with remedies narrowly tailored to the
alleged violation and with those attempting a broader reach. To date,
only one situation has consistently met the compelling interest
requirement: remedying the effects of discrimination. Once that interest
has been established, the strict scrutiny analysis turns to a set of factors
for considering whether an affirmative action plan is narrowly tailored as
a remedial measure.
A. The Development of Strict Scrutiny in the
Public Employment Context
A majority of the Court did not formally adopt the strict scrutiny test
for race-conscious affirmative action until 1989.14 Yet, in two pre-1989
decisions, a plurality of the Court analyzed public employment
affirmative action plans within the framework of strict scrutiny. In
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,'5 the Court looked at the
evidentiary basis required to establish a compelling government interest
in providing a remedy for past or present discrimination.'6 The
7 the Court promulgated a
following year, in United States v. Paradise,'
list of factors for assessing whether an affirmative action plan is
narrowly tailored. 8 Together, these two cases have become the blueprint
for lower court analysis of public employment affirmative action plans.
In Wygant, a plurality of the Court established guidelines for the
compelling government interest prong of the strict scrutiny test. Wygant
involved a challenge to the collective bargaining agreement negotiated
between the Jackson School Board and its teachers union, which
prohibited the school board from laying off a greater percentage of
minority teachers than the percentage who were employed at the time of
14. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989)
(plurality opinion); see also id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
15. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).

16.

See id. at 274.

17.
18.

480 U.S. 149 (1987).
See id at 171.

the layoff. The layoff preference was designed to preserve the gains in
minority hiring that had been made by ongoing affirmative action." The
district court upheld the layoff preference,2' deciding that the agreement
was valid "as an attempt to remedy societal discrimination by providing
'role models' for minority schoolchildren." '
On review, the Supreme Court held that the layoff preference should
be subject to strict scrutiny, and thus considered whether it was justified
by a compelling government interest.2 The most significant flaw of the
layoff preference was that it was not based on specific findings of past
school board discrimination. According to the plurality, the role model
theory adopted by the district court had "no logical stopping point,"
because it would permit the school board "to engage in discriminatory
hiring and layoff practices long past the point required by any legitimate
remedial purpose."' Societal discrimination alone, the plurality stated,
is "too amorphous"'26 to justify race-conscious action by government
employers:
No one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country.

But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against
innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and overexpansive. In
the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold remedies that are

ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the
future. 27
The plurality declined to review the school board's "belated" assertion
that it could prove that it had discriminated in the past." Rather, the
plurality suggested that consideration of past discrimination was
unnecessary in light of its finding that the layoff preference, even if
supported by a compelling government interest, was not narrowly
tailored.29
In concluding that the plan was not narrowly tailored, Justice Powell,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, recognized that
"in order to remedy the effects of prior discrimination, it may be
19. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270 (plurality opinion).
20. See id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
22. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272 (plurality opinion). The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984).
23. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
24. See id. at 274-75 (discussing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.

299 (1977)).
25.

Id. at 275.

26.

Id. at 276.

27.

Id.

28.
29.

See id. at 278.
See id.

582
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necessary to take race into account." 30 However, Justice Powell asserted
that taking race into account through layoff preferences, as opposed to
hiring preferences, imposes too heavy a burden on innocent third parties
who are laid off despite greater seniority. 3' Because other, less intrusive,
means were available for accomplishing the board's purposes, the layoff
preference did not satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement of strict
scrutiny.32 Justice Powell also noted that the preference was potentially
overbroad because its definition of minority included "blacks, Orientals,
American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent,"33 despite the lack of
evidence or suggestion that the school board had previously discriminated
against these ethnic groups.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, agreed with Justice
Powell's conclusion regarding the narrowly tailored prong-but for
separately stated reasons.'
According to Justice O'Connor, the
preference was not narrowly tailored because it was based on a
comparison of the percentage of minority teachers with the percentage of
minority students, a consideration unrelated to a remedial purpose.33
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion highlights an important issue

left unresolved by the plurality, which remains an open question even
today: is remedying past discrimination the only interest sufficiently
compelling to survive strict scrutiny? According to Justice O'Connor's
Wygant opinion, the answer is no. There, she recognized that racial
diversity may also be a compelling government interest in an affirmative
action context, adding that "nothing the Court has said today necessarily
forecloses the possibility that the Court will find other governmental
interests which have been relied upon in the lower courts but which have
not been passed on here to be sufficiently 'important' or 'compelling' to
'
sustain the use of affirmative action policies."36
Justice O'Connor also clarified the plurality's prohibition on societal
discrimination by positively stating that public employers need not
present specific or contemporaneous evidence of discrimination to
30. Id. at 280.
31. See id. at 283 ("While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing
only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial
equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.
That burden is too intrusive.").
32. See id. at 283-84.
33. Id. at 284 n. 13.
34. See id. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

35. See id.
36.

Id. at 286.

support an affirmative action plan."
A contemporaneous finding
requirement could chill public employers from voluntarily acting to
address past discrimination?
Nevertheless, public employers
implementing affirmative action to remedy past discrimination "must
have a firm basis for determining" that affirmative action is necessary
under the circumstances.' 9 For example, a statistical disparity between
the percentage of African-American teachers and the percentage of
African-Americans in the relevant labor market (that is, those qualified
to be teachers) could serve as a firm evidentiary basis for the necessity
of remedial action by the school board.4
Wygant helped define the first prong of the strict scrutiny test as it
applies to affirmative action in the public employment context.
Although it essentially foreclosed the option of using societal
discrimination as a basis for remedial affirmative action, Wygant also
confirmed that specific individualized findings of discrimination are not
required to justify remedial affirmative action. Instead, statistical
evidence may be sufficient to justify race-conscious affirmative action
where relevant comparisons are drawn between actual minority
employment rates and the qualified minority work force.
However, the Wygant Court left many issues unsettled. The Court did
not establish a specific standard for proving past discrimination

sufficient to justify affirmative action-it merely stated what is
not sufficient. In addition, the Court did not resolve the question of
whether other interests, beyond remedying discrimination, could be
considering compelling under a strict scrutiny analysis.
Although four justices (Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor)
concluded that the layoff preference at issue in Wygant was not narrowly
tailored,41 their opinions did not provide any meaningful guidelines for
lower courts in determining when an affirmative action plan is narrowly
tailored. One year later, the Court addressed this issue in United States
37.
38.

See id. at 289.
See id. at 291. Justice O'Connor recognized an important difference between
public and private employers in this respect. "The value of voluntary compliance is
doubly important when it is a public employer that acts, both because of the example its
voluntary assumption of responsibility sets and because the remediation of governmental
discrimination is of unique importance." Md at 290.
39. Id. at 292.
40. See id. Nonminorities challenging an affirmative action plan could rebut such
statistical evidence. See id. at 293. Justice O'Connor noted that in the instant case, the
nonminority teachers would still have the burden of showing that the evidence was
insufficient to infer private discrimination. See id. "Only by meeting this burden could
the plaintiffs establish a violation of their constitutional rights, and thereby defeat the
presumption that the Board's assertedly remedial action based on the statistical evidence
was justified." Id.
41. See id. at 269 (plurality opinion).
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42 by enumerating the factors that should be considered when
v. Paradise
determining whether a race-conscious affirmative action plan is
narrowly tailored.
In Paradise,the Supreme Court affirmed a race-conscious plan (Plan)
designed to address promotion practices in the Alabama Department of
Public Safety.43 The United States alleged that the Plan, which
temporarily required that fifty percent of promotions in the Department
be awarded to African-Americans, was unconstitutional."4 The district
court formulated the Plan pursuant to two consent decrees, which called
for court intervention when the parties were unable to agree on an
interim promotional procedure. 5 In designing the Plan, the district court
attempted to confront the Department's long history of defiance of its
previous orders:

On February 10, 1984... twelve years will have passed since this court
condemned the racially discriminatory policies and practices of [the
Department]. Nevertheless, the effects of these policies and practices remain
pervasive and conspicuous at all ranks above the entry-level position.... [T]he
department still operates an upper rank structure in which almost every trooper
obtained his position through procedures that totally excluded black persons....
The preceding scenario is intolerable and must not continue. The time has
6 now
arrived for the department to... open the upper ranks to black troopers."

The fifty percent requirement was intended to remain in effect only until
the Department established permanent, race-neutral promotion
procedures for each rank. 7 Furthermore, it would be enforceable only
when qualified African-American candidates were available to fill
positions in ranks which comprised less than twenty-five percent

African-Americans.4
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the order as a
"temporary remedy" that would be suspended as soon as the Department
developed "objective, neutral employment criteria" to select and
promote its employees. 49 According to the district court, the use of

42. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
43. See id. at 153, 186 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 195 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
44. See id. at 153 (plurality opinion).
45. See id. at 162.
46. Id. at 162-63 (quoting Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (M.D. Ala.
1983)).

47. See id. at 163.
48. See id.
49.

Id. at 156 (quoting NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (1974)).

quotas was permissible in this case in order to eliminate the continuing
effects of past discrimination." Such effects persisted not only in the
overall paucity of black state troopers, but especially in the upper ranks

of the Department, where the effects of discriminatory hiring had been
multiplied by preferential treatment of whites in training, discipline, and
evaluation." African-Americans, facing a harsh path to promotion, left
the force in greater numbers than whites, further compounding
disparities in their representation as permanent troopers.
In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court again lacked the necessary
majority to establish the level of scrutiny required for remedying past
racial discrimination. 3 Nevertheless, four justices (Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Powell) held that the disputed quota would survive even
strict scrutiny.' First, the district court's order was supported by a
compelling interest in remedying the continuing effects of past
discrimination:5 "the pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory
conduct of the Department created a profound need and a firm
justification for the race-conscious relief ordered by the District Court."56
Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, rejected the
Department's effort to separate the discriminatory results of its hiring
procedures from its promotion procedures.57 The plurality found that
while the Department's discriminatory practices had an effect on both
hiring and promotion, the effect on promotions alone was sufficient to
justify affirmative relief. 8
The plurality then considered whether the Plan was narrowly tailored
to remedy past discrimination.59 The Court focused its review on
specific criteria:
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to
several factors, including the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of
alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the

availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals to the

50. See id. The district court had found the Department had systematically
excluded African-Americans for nearly four decades. See id. at 167.

51. See id. at 157 (quoting Paradise v. Dothard, Civ. Action No. 3561-N (M.D.
Ala. 1975)).

52. See id.

53. See id. at 166 ("[A]lthough this Court has consistently held that some elevated
level of scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic distinction is made for remedial
purposes, it has yet to reach consensus on the appropriate constitutional analysis.").

54. See id. at 167.

55. See id. at 167-68 n.18.
56. Id. at 167. In its opinion, the plurality provided a twelve-year timeline of the
Department's efforts to resist integration and its persistent discriminatory actions against

African-Americans. See id. at 154-66.
57. See id. at 169.
58. See id. at 169-70.
59. See id. at 171.

586
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relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.

°

Application of the narrowly tailored prong thus became a fact-intensive
analysis of the remedial promotion Plan in light of these factors.
First, the plurality examined the underlying purposes of the Plan to
assess the feasibility of race-neutral alternatives."1 The Plan was
designed to eliminate the effects of discriminatory practices and force
the Department to finally comply with the consent decrees by
developing a valid promotional procedure in an expeditious manner.6 2
The plurality rejected the alternatives proposed by the government and
the Department for failure to advance these purposes.63 The Department
had proposed promotion of four African-American and eleven white
troopers in the interim.'
According to the plurality, even if the
Department's proposal would not adversely impact African-Americans,
it was an unacceptable alternative because it failed to provide an
incentive for expeditiously establishing valid promotional procedures

and failed to remedy the effects of the Department's repeated delays in
developing a valid procedure.65 "To permit ad hoc decisionmaking to
continue and allow only 4 of 15 slots to be filled by blacks would have
denied relief to black troopers who had irretrievably lost promotion
opportunities.""6
The plurality also rejected the government's contention that, as an
alternative, the district court could have imposed significant fines and
fees on the Department to encourage its compliance with the consent
decrees. 7 Throughout the twelve-year litigation history, the district
court had repeatedly ordered the Department to pay the plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees and costs, but "these court orders had done little to
prevent future foot-dragging." ' Furthermore, fees and fines would not
compensate the African-American troopers who were wrongfully denied
promotions in the past.69
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 172.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 173-74.
Id.

67.

See id. at 174-75.

68.
69.

Id.
See id. at 175. "While fines vindicate the court's authority, here they would not

fulfill the court's additional responsibility to 'eliminate the discriminatory effects of the
past as well as bar like discrimination in the future."' Id. at 175 n.25 (quoting Louisiana

Having dismissed the alternatives as unfeasible, the plurality next
analyzed whether the Plan could adapt to the demands of changing
circumstances. Several features of the Plan persuaded the Court that it
was sufficiently flexible.70 These included a waiver of the fifty percent
promotion requirement where there were no qualified African-American
candidates available.7 In addition, the plurality emphasized that no
"gratuitous promotions" were required,' since the fifty percent
requirement was only triggered when the Department needed to make
promotions. Finally, the Department controlled the duration of the
Plan. Once the Department put a nondiscriminatory procedure in place,
the fifty percent requirement would end.74
In finding the Plan to be sufficiently flexible, the plurality went
beyond the specifics articulated by the Plan itself and examined how it
was actually implemented.7 5 Where no qualified African-American
candidates were available for promotion to a specific rank, the district
court had in fact allowed the Department to promote one hundred
percent white troopers.76
Once the Department submitted
nondiscriminatory promotional procedures for the ranks of corporal and
sergeant, the district court had suspended the fifty percent requirement at

those ranks.77
The plurality also held that the fifty percent goal was narrowly tailored
to the overall goal of twenty-five percent African-Americans at all levels
in the Department's workforce.78 The plurality pointed out that "the 50%
figure is not itself the goal; rather it represents the speed at which the
' A speedier remedy was justified in this
goal of 25% will be achieved."79
case because of the Department's past history of egregious
discrimination and delays.'
The plurality also found that the impact of the promotional Plan did
not place an undue burden on third parties." This finding was premised
on the fact that the Plan was temporary and limited, and did not totally
exclude white troopers from receiving promotions. 2 Citing Wygant, the
v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
70. See id. at 178.

71.
72.
73.
74.

See id. at 177.
Id. at 177-78.
See id. at 178.
See id.

75.

See id. at 178-79.

76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at 179.
See id.
See id.
Id.

80.

See id.
at 180-81.

81.
82.

See id. at 182.
See id.

[VOL.

37: 575, 2000]

Affinnative Action
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

plurality emphasized that postponement of promotional opportunities is
not as severe a burden as layoffs: "like a hiring goal, it 'impose[s] a
diffuse burden,.... foreclosing only one of several opportunities."' 83
Justice Powell acknowledged that, while the promotional goals did
diffuse the remedial burden throughout society in general, any burden
placed upon nonminorities was merely a delay, rather than an absolute
denial.,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's
dissent, agreeing that a government actor has a comyelling interest when
it acts to remedy past or present discrimination.
However, Justice
O'Connor argued that the district court's purpose in designing the fifty
percent promotion requirement was to compel the Department to comply
with the consent decrees-not to remedy past discrimination.8 6 "If the
order were truly designed to eradicate the effects of the Department's
delay, the District Court would certainly have continued the use of the
one-for-one quota even after the Department had complied with the
'
consent decrees."87
Justice O'Connor's analysis focused on alternatives to a one-for-one

quota, including the imposition of fines or penalties, or the appointment
of a trustee to develop a promotion procedure.8 Under her view of strict
scrutiny, the availability of alternatives to imposing race-conscious
classifications necessarily defeated any argument that the district court's
promotional plan is narrowly tailored to eliminate past discrimination.
'The District Court, however, did not discuss these options or any other
alternatives to the use of a racial quota. Not a single alternative method
of achieving compliance with the consent decrees is even mentioned in
the District Court's opinion.. . ." Strict scrutiny, according to Justice
O'Connor, requires at the very minimum that a court discuss the
feasibility of race-neutral alternatives prior to upholding any race-

83.

Id. at 183 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd.of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986)

(Powell, J.,
concurring)).
84. See id. at 189 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. See id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 197-98.
87. Id. at 198.
88. See id. at 199-200. Although the plurality did discuss the feasibility of fines or
penalties, see supra note 67 and accompanying text, Justice O'Connor's objection was
that the district court itself did not discuss race-neutral alternatives in its order. See id. at
200.
89. Id.

conscious measures.' During the next decade, the focus on alternatives
to affirmative action would intensify.
B.

The New Debate: Is Strict Scrutiny the Death Knell
for Affirmative Action?

The year 1989 proved a watershed for affirmative action in the United
States. The Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.9' clearly established the standard of strict scrutiny as the
benchmark for cases in which a state or local government seeks to apply
a racially based classification."
Six years later, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena," the Court confirmed its ruling in Croson
and applied the strict scrutiny standard to federal as well as state and
local government affirmative action plans.94 As soon as an agreement
was reached on the level of scrutiny to be applied, however, the justices
once again split into separate camps on a host of other issues. The
debate on the Court moved from how strictly affirmative action should
be scrutinized to a more fundamental question: is affirmative action
good policy? This shift in focus renders the future of affirmative action
uncertain. Although Croson and Adarand have helped lower courts by
clarifying technical aspects of the law, the varying opinions of the

justices on the vices and virtues of affirmative action have left more
confusion than understanding in their wake.95
In Croson, the Court held that the City of Richmond's Minority
Business Utilization Plan (Plan), which set aside a percentage of work
on city contracts for minority contractors, violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Plan required that prime
contractors who were awarded city contracts utilize minority
subcontractors for at least thirty percent of the dollar value of work
involved.9" For the first time, a majority of the Court agreed that strict
90.

See id.at201.

91.

488 U.S. 469 (1989).

92. See id. at 493-94 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).
93. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
94. See id. at 235.

95. Croson and Adarand do not directly address public employment affmative
action plans. Both cases involved racial preferences in the public procurement context.
However, the Court did not expressly limit its holdings in these cases to minority setasides in public procurement. In addition, as the Court's most recent pronouncements on
the constitutionality of affirnative action, lower courts consider both Croson and
Adarand to be applicable even in the public employment context. See George R. La
Noue, The Impact of Croson on Equal ProtectionLaw and Policy, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1, 16

(1997).
96.
97.

See 488 U.S. at 477-78, 511.
See id. at 477.
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scrutiny was the appropriate test to apply to race-conscious affirmative
action.98
The City asserted that the Plan was designed to remedy past
discrimination suffered by minorities in the construction industry."
Preferential treatment under the Plan was not limited to the Richmond
area-any minority contractor was eligible to participate."° The Plan
defined "minority" as "Blacks, Spanish-speaking [citizens], Orientals,
requirements
Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts."'O' Waivers of the Plan's
2
were allowed, but only in exceptional circumstances.'0
The City's evidentiary support of the Plan's remedial purpose
included a showing of statistical disparity between the percentage of
African-Americans in the City's population (50%) and the percentage of
the City's construction contracts that had been awarded to minority
contractors from 1978 to 1983 (0.67%).1°0 The City also relied on the
fact that a number of contractors' associations in the area had virtually
no minority business members.'04 Yet the City had no direct evidence of
discrimination either by the City in awarding contracts, or by prime
contractors when subcontracting City work. 5 Neither was the thirty
percent quota used in the Plan tied to any statistical evidence of the
availability of minority contractors in the Richmond area."O6
A majority of the Court held that the City's evidence of discrimination
was not sufficient to meet the compelling government interest prong of
the strict scrutiny test.'0 7 The Court found the City's evidence lacking
for the same reasons it had rejected the affirmative action plan at issue in
Wygant: "a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination
in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to
98. See id. at 493-94 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).

99. See id. at 478 (plurality opinion).
100. See id.
101.
102.

Id. at 478 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 478-79. In fact, the City denied Croson's request for a waiver after

the only minority subcontractor available came in with a price that was $7,663.16 over
Croson's original bid. See id. at 482-83. The City also denied Croson's request for an
increase of the contract price, and told Croson that it intended to rebid the project. See
id. at 483. Croson then sued the City in federal court, challenging the Plan's
constitutionality. See id.
103. See id. at 479-80.

104.

See id. at 480.

105.
106.
107.

See id.
See id. at 486.
See id. at 505.

determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy."'' 3 The
City's comparison of the percentage of minority contracts awarded with
general population statistics could not be used to demonstrate
discrimination.'09 Instead, where special qualifications are required, the
comparison must be with the percentage of minorities in the general

population who possess those specific qualifications.!"
Similarly, the Court rejected the City's evidence with respect to the
low minority membership in construction industry associations:
For low minority membership in these associations to be relevant, the city

would have to link it to the number of local MBE's [minority business
enterprises] eligible for membership. If the statistical disparity between eligible

MBE's and MBE membership were great enough, an inference of
discriminatory exclusion could arise. In such a case, the city would have a
compelling interest in preventing its tax dollars from assisting these
organizations in maintaining a racially segregated construction market."I

The Court also noted that the "random inclusion" of minority groups
such as Orientals, Indians, and Eskimos contradicted the City's assertion
that the Plan was designed to serve a remedial purpose, since
it had
2
found no evidence of any discrimination against these groups.1
In a brief discussion of the Plan, with respect to narrow tailoring, the
Court made two important points."' First, the Court noted that the City
did not consider race-neutral measures as an alternative to the thirty
percent quota."14 Second, the Court stated that the thirty percent quota
established in the Plan was not "narrowly tailored to any goal, except
perhaps outright racial balancing.""' 5 Based on these considerations, the
Court held that the6 Plan was not narrowly tailored to serve its asserted
remedial interest."
The majority spirit of the Court was short-lived, however. A mere
plurality agreed on situations in which a government agency can act to
redress discrimination and its effects."7 Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and White, concluded that
a government actor, such as the City of Richmond, is not limited to

using race-conscious measures to remedy its own discrimination."8
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 498.
See id. at 501.
See id at 501-02.
Id. at503.
See id. at 506.
See id. at 507.
See id.

115. Id.

116. See id. at508.
117. See id. at 509 (plurality opinion).
118. See id. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice

White, also stated:
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"Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking
action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its
jurisdiction.'.. Identified discrimination includes discrimination by the
government actor implementing an affirmative action plan, or private
actors. Justice Kennedy echoed this point in his concurring opinion,
asserting that "the State has the power to eradicate racial discrimination
and its effects in both the public and private sectors, and the absolute
duty to do so where those wrongs were caused intentionally by the State
itself.''
Justice Scalia, however, disagreed with this conclusion, arguing that
only Congress and federal courts, not state actors, should be able to use

racial classifications as a remedy for past discrimination.'"

Justice

Scalia justified this distinction between federal and state actors by
arguing that the Equal Protection Clause was specifically enacted to deal
with the states' oppression of racial minorities, and because
discrimination is more likely to occur at the state and local levels.'2
According to Justice Scalia, the Equal Protection Clause embraces the

principle that "our 'Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor
24
tolerates classes among citizens.

Justice Scalia went on to indict the concept of "benign"
[I]f the city could show that it had essentially become a 'passive participant' in

a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction
industry, we think it clear that the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle
such a system. It is beyond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has
a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax
contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private
prejudice.
Id. at 492 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 509.
120. See id. For example, "[ijf the city of Richmond had evidence before it that
nonminority contractors were systematically excluding minority businesses from
subcontracting opportunities, it could take action to end the discriminatory exclusion."
Id.
121. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
122. See id. at 521-22 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
123. See id. at 521-23.
124. See id. at 521 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,
J.,dissenting)). The "color-blind Constitution" concept originated in Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in the infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson. However, Justice
Harlan's opinion was not that of the Court, and it was not until decades later that the
Court finally rejected the "separate but equal" principle adopted by the Plessy majority.
See Brown v. Bd.of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Given that background, to focus
on the color-blind rationale at this point is to turn one's back on a constitutional history
where color was extremely relevant.

discrimination, calling attention to the fact that, whether classified as
benign or invidious, racial classifications impose a price on individuals
who have a "right not to be disadvantaged on the basis of race.""'
While recognizing that African-Americans have suffered great
discrimination in our society, Justice Scalia argued that trying to "even
the score" through racial classifications would be contrary to the
constitutional protection of individuals, as opposed to groups, and
solidify the notion that society should be viewed as racial groups rather
than individuals." 6
Justice Stevens, who joined in the majority opinion, wrote separately
to express his opinion that remedying past discrimination should not be
the only permissible compelling government interest under the strict
scrutiny test. 27 According to Justice Stevens, "race is not always
irrelevant to sound governmental decisionmaking."' Because in this
case no alternative reason was asserted for factoring race into the
selection of a contractor-such as more efficient performance of the
contracts-Stevens left open the possibility that there may be cases,
perhaps similar to Wygant, in which it could be argued that a diverse
faculty enhances and improves the education of students 29
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, called the majority's
decision a "giant step backward" for affirmative action, and a "grapeshot
attack on race-conscious remedies in general."'"3 According to Justice
Marshall, the City should have been entitled to rely on congressional
findings of national discrimination to justify the Plan. 3' He also

disagreed with the application of strict scrutiny to remedial affirmative
action, arguing instead that the City should only be required to show
"important governmental objectives" and a plan that is "substantially
related" to achieving those objectives, a test that Marshall argued the
City's Plan could have passed. 32 Justice Marshall's argument that

125. Id. at 527.
126. Id. at 527-28. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice
Scalia's opinion in that it supported the proposition that "[t]he moral imperative of racial
neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). However, Justice Kennedy did not agree with Justice Scalia's rule of

"automatic invalidity for racial preferences in almost every case" because it was not
consistent with the Court's precedent. Id. at 519.

127. See id. at 511 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).

128. Id. at512.
129. See id. at 512-13.
130. Id. at 529 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
131. See id. at 530 ("[T]he city council had before it a rich trove of evidence that
discrimination in the Nation's construction industry had seriously impaired the
competitive position of businesses owned or controlled by members of minority
groups.").

132. See id. at 535-36.
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benign, remedial racial classifications should be treated differently from
invidious discrimination would be squarely addressed in the Court's next
pronouncement
on affirmative action, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
133
Pena.
In Adarand, the Court ostensibly brought finality and consistency to

the questions surrounding the level of scrutiny that must be applied to
affirmative action. Holding that all racial classifications, state and
federal, must be analyzed under strict scrutiny, Adarandoverruled Metro
Broadcasting, Inc., v. Federal Communications Commission,'3 a case
that had been decided just five years earlier.1 35 In the six short years
since Croson, the landscape of the Court had changed dramatically. The
three dissenting justices in Croson, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
Marshall, were no longer on the Court. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Souter were appointed as their replacements. In body, and perhaps in
spirit, they formed the dissent in Adarand. Ironically, they were joined
by Justice Stevens, who had concurred with the Court's holding in
Croson. Yet Justices Thomas and Scalia, concurring in Adarand,
together with Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Kennedy, provided a
majority for the Court.
Adarand involved a challenge to a federal statute that paid bonuses to
federal contractors who hired subcontractors that were "controlled by
'socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.' ' 1 36 Subcontractors
of certain races were presumed to fall within the disadvantaged
category. 37 This presumption of disadvantage could be rebutted by a
third party. 38 Adarand Constructors sued the City when its low bid on a
federal project was rejected by the general contractor, who retained a
higher-bidding minority subcontractor in exchange for the federal bonus
dollars provided by the statute.'39
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor stated that past precedents
regarding the constitutionality of racial classifications could be
133. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
134. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). In Metro Broadcasting, the Court upheld the Federal

Communications Commission's minority ownership policies under an intermediate
scrutiny standard because they "bear the imprimatur of longstanding congressional

support and direction and are substantially related to the achievement of the important
governmental objective of broadcast diversity." Id. at 600.
135. See Adarand,515 U.S. at 227.
136. Id. at 204 (quoting Brief for Petitioner Adarand Constructors).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 208.
139. See id. at 208-10.

summarized into three general propositions: (1) skepticism of all racial
classifications, exemplified by the application of strict scrutiny across
the board; (2) consistency, in that all forms of discrimination, benign and
invidious, are subject to strict scrutiny; and (3) congruence between the
standards applicable to racial classifications by the federal government
under the Fifth Amendment and state classifications under the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Based on these three propositions, the Court
held that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state,
or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.
In other words, such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further

compelling governmental interests."'
The Court imposed a strict scrutiny standard for all racial
classifications because they are "seldom" justified, and "too pernicious"
to permit any lesser form of scrutiny."" Despite this strong language, the
Court also stated that it wanted to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,"' reiterating that even under strict
scrutiny, government actors can still address the "lingering effects" of
discrimination. 3 The case was remanded to the lower court to
determine whether in fact the statutory scheme survived strict scrutiny.'"
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia went further than the majority
in condemning affirmative action. Justice Scalia stated that the
government can never have a compelling government interest in making
up for past discrimination against an entire race because constitutional
rights are held by individuals, not by racial groups.'45 According to
Justice Scalia, the use of a racial classification, for any purpose,
"reinforce[s] and preserve[s] for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American."'46 Although
Justice Scalia did not dispute the decision to remand the case, he noted
that it was highly unlikely that the statute could withstand strict
scrutiny.'47
Justice Thomas continued the assault on affirmative action in his
concurring opinion, equating benign racial preferences with invidious

140. See id. at 223-24.
141. Id. at 227.
142. See id. at 236.
143. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring injudgment)).
144. See id. at 238-39.
145. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
146. Id.
147. See id.
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discrimination.'4 ' He also endorsed the "color-blind" concept advocated
by Justice Scalia in his Croson concurrence: "under our Constitution, the

government may not make distinctions on the basis of race," regardless
of whether the motive behind the distinction is what Justice Thomas
calls "paternalism" or oppression. ' According to Justice Thomas,
benign discrimination fosters "attitudes of superiority" and resentment

among the majority race, while imposing a "badge of inferiority" on
minorities which "may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt
an attitude" of entitlement. 50

In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for its
Stevens
"disconcerting lecture" on the ills of racial classifications.'
rejected the notion espoused in the majority and concurring opinions that

benign and invidious forms of discrimination are morally and
According to Stevens, courts can
constitutionally equivalent.'52
adequately determine whether a racial classification is motivated by

benign or invidious purposes; then less scrutiny can appropriately be
applied when the motives are benign.'53 Stevens also pointed out the
anomalous result of Adarand in comparison to the application of Equal
Protection in other contexts. For example, after Adarand, a racial
preference is subject to higher scrutiny in the courts than a gender
preference, "even though the primary purpose of the Equal Protection

Clause was to end discrimination" against African-Americans in the
postslavery era.m
Justice Ginsburg's dissent focused on the areas of agreement in the
various opinions of the Court. 5 First, however, she responded to Justice

Scalia's concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg noted that, as a country,
Americans are still dealing with the effects of discrimination "because,
148. See id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 240. See also City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).

150.
151.

Id. at 241.
Id. at 242 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

152.

See id. at 243.

154.

Id. at 247.

153. See id. at 246. Justice Stevens thought that the majority may, in fact, have
been applying a lesser form of strict scrutiny to benign discrimination because it stated
that strict scrutiny would not be fatal in fact. See id. at 243-44 n.l. Even though the
majority may have set a lesser standard, Justice Stevens still objected because the mere
application of strict scrutiny would put "well-crafted benign programs at unnecessary
risk" of invalidation by lower courts applying strict scrutiny in its traditional form. Id. at
244 n.1.
155. See id. at 271 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

for most of our Nation's history, the idea that 'we are just one race' was
not embraced."' 56 Justice Ginsburg noted that Justice Harlan introduced
57
the concept of a "color-blind" Constitution in his Plessy v. Ferguson
dissent, where he also stated that whites were the "dominant" race, and
that the white race would remain dominant "if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty."'58
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that despite the differences in the
Justices' opinions, the Court as a whole acknowledged that the
government may act to address not only discrimination itself, but also its
effects.'59 Justice Ginsburg agreed that close judicial review of racial
classifications is necessary, particularly in light of the potential impact
such actions have on third parties.IW However, she also recognized that
"[b]ias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and
unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if
equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become
this country's law and practice."''
These dissenting opinions from the new guard on the Court leave open
the possibility that the Court's approach to affirmative action may still
allow "our precedent to evolve, still to be informed by and responsive to
changing conditions." 2
Justice Ginsburg, for example, while
acknowledging that "catchup mechanisms designed to cope with the
lingering effects of entrenched racial subjugation" can indeed inflict

harm on the favored race, further suggests that "Court review can ensure
that preferences are not so large as to trammel unduly upon the
opportunities of others or interfere too harshly with legitimate
expectations of persons in once-preferred groups."'6 3 Similarly, Justice
Souter proposed that even when the innocent bear the burden of
remediating past discrimination, such a price "is considered
reasonable... [under] the assumption... that the effects will
156. Id. at 272 (quoting id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
157. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
158. Adarand,515 U.S. at 272 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. See id. at 273. Justice Souter also emphasized this point in his dissenting
opinion:
The Court has long accepted the view that constitutional authority to remedy
past discrimination is not limited to the power to forbid its continuation, but
extends to eliminating those effects that would otherwise persist and skew the
operation of public systems even in the absence of current intent to practice
any discrimination.
Id. at 269 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 276 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at274.
162. Id. at 276.

163.

Id.
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themselves recede into the past, becoming attenuated and finally

disappearing."'' 4
C. Summary
The Supreme Court's decision in Croson, and its subsequent
broadening in Adarand, have firmly established strict scrutiny as the test
for constitutionality of affirmative action programs in government
employment. Yet on their facts, these cases, together with Wygant and
Paradise, leave a wide margin of uncertainty. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in his Adarand dissent, "substantial agreement on the
standard to be applied in deciding difficult cases does not necessarily
lead to agreement on how those cases actually should or will be
resolved."'6'
There is still no consensus among the members of the Court on how
"strictly" strict scrutiny should apply. Justices Scalia and Thomas
obviously prefer that strict scrutiny be fatal in fact for most, if not all,
racial classifications. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens
have expressed confidence that courts can determine the underlying
motivations of racial classifications, whether benign or invidious, and
apply a less strict form of scrutiny when the motivation is benign.
Finally, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Rehnquist represent the
middle ground on the Court with respect to affirmative action. Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Adarand suggests a standard that is something
less than traditional strict scrutiny, because the Justices clearly
anticipated that strict scrutiny would not be an automatic rule of
invalidity. However, the Court has provided little guidance, beyond the

traditional formulation of strict scrutiny, to lower courts that might be
willing to transcend traditional boundaries.
With respect to the first prong of strict scrutiny-the compelling
government interest-lower courts have only the vague "substantial
basis in evidence" test from Croson and Wygant's proscription against
the use of societal discrimination as a basis for a remedy. The Court has
not provided any further detail on the second prong-the narrowly
tailored requirement-since enumerating its list of factors in Paradise.
In between these "guidelines," the Court has interwoven inconsistency
and contradiction vis-h-vis dicta both supporting and deriding
164.
165.

Id. at 270 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 242 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

affirmative action, considering its effects on its beneficiaries, and yet
contrasting its impact on nonminority third parties. The net result is that

the lower courts are left to wade through a mire of opinions-much less
a seamless fabric than a tangled web-when determining the
constitutionality of affirmative action plans.
To complicate matters further, the permissible affirmative action plan
in Paradiserepresents an extreme which is increasingly uncommon in
today's society. In that case, a recalcitrant, even obstinate, bureaucracy
repeatedly refused to take voluntary steps to eliminate obvious
discrimination among its ranks. The relevant labor pool undoubtedly
comprised willing and able minorities seeking employment as state
troopers. Yet the Alabama Department of Public Safety refused to make
the necessary changes, even to its own detriment. In contrast, the City of
Richmond in Croson failed to prove that actual discrimination had taken
place in hiring contractors. Statistical disparities between minority
populations of contractors and the general community, although
undoubtedly a result of the cumulative effects of decades of societal
discrimination, could not be attributed to specific acts of the
government.
However, many situations faced today do not fall neatly under such
precedential extremes. Twenty-first century bigot.7 is more subtle and
Only in rare cases
sophisticated, and has largely gone underground.'
will direct proof be found of specific instances of actual discrimination
in today's employment market. Thus, statistical comparisons have
become the necessary, if imperfect, measure of particular discrimination.
Another area of uncertainty that remains is whether any justification
other than remediating past discrimination would pass the test of strict
scrutiny. Although the Court has ruled out consideration of race for the
purposes of racial balancing or even for providing role models, the issue
of diversity has never been settled. For example, as suggested by Justice
Powell in Bakke, can race be considered among other factors in
employment decisions when having a heterogenous population is a
desirable or even a necessary characteristic of the specific labor pool?
166. See generally Christopher Edley, Jr., Color at Century's End: Race in Law,
Policy, and Politics, 67 FoRIHAM L. REv. 939, 942 (1998) (suggesting that
discrimination persists, in subtle forms); Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism
Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between
Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
1003, 1049 (1997) ("[D]iscrimination has become much less overt; much discriminatory
behavior is the result of unconscious processes and biases."); David A. Strauss, The Law
and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical
Standards, 79 GEo. L.J. 1619, 1619 (1991) (arguing that the extent of discrimination in
today's workplace is difficult to determine because of the covert nature of modem
discrimination).
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As discussed below, this question may turn on the specific facts of a
particular case, which may indeed warrant race-conscious actions under

narrow circumstances.
III. THE AFrERMATH OF STRICT SCRUTINY IN THE LOWER COURTS

After the Supreme Court decided Croson, lower courts began applying
the strict scrutiny test to affirmative action programs in the public
employment arena.'67 Courts seem resigned to view Croson as an

important change in the law regarding race-conscious measures for
remedying past and present discrimination.'" Particularly in the area of
public employment, Croson has had an unparalleled impact, since courts

have accepted the Croson decision as a significant change in the law,
sufficient to warrant modification or termination of existing consent
decrees."6

The

significance

of this

development

cannot be

167. See Krupa v. New Castle County, 732 F. Supp. 497, 506 (D.Del. 1990) (citing

Croson and stating that "[t]he standard that the Supreme Court would apply to a race
based affirmative action plan under equal protection clause analysis is finally settled.
Strict scrutiny will now be applied by a majority of the Court.... ."); see also Charles
Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the
Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155, 156 (1989) ("Croson is significant. For the first
time a majority of the Court holds unequivocally that all racial classifications-what the
scholars' statement calls 'inclusive' remedial measures as well as what it calls 'invidious
discrimination' or 'exclusionary practices'-must pass strict scrutiny and be justified by
a compelling governmental purpose.") (citation omitted). But see Scholars' Reply to
Professor Fried, 99 YALE L.J. 163, 165-66 (1989) (arguing that Croson is not a
significant change because the Supreme Court had already applied strict scrutiny in
previous cases determining the constitutionality of affirmative action plans prior to
Croson).

168. See, e.g., Freeman v. City of Fayetteville, 971 F. Supp. 971, 975 (E.D.N.C.
1997) (citing Croson for the proposition that affirmative action plans are subject to strict
scrutiny, and noting that this was not the law in 1974, when the consent decree at issue
was initially implemented). The Freeman court concluded that "It]he constitutional
ceiling of the Fourteenth Amendment has been lowered, resulting in the transformation
of rigid race-based quotas from allowable remedies to illegal constrictions" under a strict
scrutiny analysis. Id. at 977.
169. Under the standard established by the Supreme Court in Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), a consent decree can be modified when "a
significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree." Id. at 383. A
change in law qualifies as a change warranting modification. See id. at 384. The Court
specifically stated that "[a] consent decree must of course be modified if, as it later turns
out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible
under federal law." Id. at 388. Croson's application of strict scrutiny to all race-based
affirmative action plans has been recognized as a change in law sufficient to require
modification of affirmative action consent decrees that do not comport with the strict
scrutiny standard. See Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1564 (11th Cir.

underestimated, considering the large number of consent decrees

approved by courts since the 1960s to address problems of racial
discrimination in employment. 7 '
Croson requires lower courts to engage in a two-step analysis to
determine whether an affirmative action plan instituted by a public
employer is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. 7' Under strict
scrutiny, a government employer must demonstrate that it has a
compelling government interest to justify the use of racial
classifications, 72 and that any affirmative action measures are narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.'73 However, lower courts have yet to rech
a consensus regarding how the two prongs of strict scrutiny analysis
should be applied to affirmative action in public employment.
A. Establishinga Compelling GovernmentInterest
1. What Interests Qualify as Compelling?
Providing a remedy for past or present discrimination in the workplace
is the most commonly asserted compelling government interest for
affirmative action in public employment.'74 Whether any other purpose
1994) ("Croson sufficiently altered the legal landscape to warrant modifications to the
present decrees under Rufo."). In Freeman, for example, the court held that an existing
consent decree must be terminated because of a change in law under Rufo. See Freeman,

971 F. Supp. at 977. Because of the change in law brought on by the implementation of
the strict scrutiny test in Croson, the Freeman court held that the "race-based quotas
imposed... by the judgment are constitutionally impermissible under [the] current state
of equal protection analysis." Id. at 977. See also Allen v. Alabama State Bd.of Educ.,
164 F.3d 1347, 1352 (lth Cir. 1999) ("The Supreme Court's recent precedents
concerning the validity of race-conscious government action 'altered the legal landscape'
in place at the time the consent decree in this case was approved and 'Rufo... requires
that consent decrees be modified to avoid any violations of governing constitutional
standards."') (quoting Ensley Branch, 31 F.3d at 1564).
170. See also Debra Baker, Backdraft, ABA J. Apr. 2000, at 48 (discussing the
effects of terminating consent decrees in public employment); Charles J.Cooper, The
CollateralAttack Doctrine and the Rules of Intervention: A JudicialPincer Movement
on Due Process,1987 U. Chi.LEGAL F. 155, 155 n.1.
171. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989)
(plurality opinion); see also id. at 520 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
172. See id. at 505 (plurality opinion).
173. See id. at 506-07. Although Croson analyzed the constitutionality of a
program that set aside a certain portion of municipal contracts for minority business
enterprises, its holding has been applied to all types of race classifications and
affirmative action initiatives. See supra note 95.
174. See Ensley Branch, 31 F.3d at 1565 ("In practice, the interest that is alleged in
support of racial preferences is almost always the same-remedying past or present
discrimination. That interest is widely accepted as compelling.") (citations omitted); see
also Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 887 F. Supp. 1479, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 1995)
("The Supreme Court has indicated that the government 'unquestionably has a
compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination."' (quoting United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion))).
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is sufficiently compelling to pass strict scrutiny, however, remains
unsettled.'75 Indeed, some courts have explicitly rejected nonremedial
promoting diversity and
purposes for affirmative action, including
176
providing role models for minorities.
In Police Ass'n v. City of New Orleans,'77 for example, a group of
police officers successfully challenged transfers and promotions made

by the City of New Orleans to increase the 17 ercentage of AfricanA previous consent
American officers in their police department.
decree had created thirty "supernumerary" sergeant positions for

African-Americans as a one-time affirmative action measure.' 79 In order
to further increase African-American representation at the sergeant level,
the City transferred certain African-American sergeants out of the
supernumerary positions into regular positions.'8 ° The City then filled
the vacant supernumerary positions by promoting other AfricanAmerican officers who had scored lower on the promotional test than
white officers who were not promoted. 8'
175. See McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting that it is unclear whether other justifications for affirmative action besides
providing a remedy for discrimination are constitutionally permissible); see also Hayes

v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 213 (4th Cir. 1993)
(stating that it was not clear whether the city's asserted purpose of providing greater
racial diversity within the police department could be a compelling government interest

for its affirmative action plan); Joint Statement, ConstitutionalScholars' Statement on

Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711, 1713
(1989) ("[T]he Supreme Court as a whole has not yet resolved the issue of what goals
other than overcoming historic discrimination may provide permissible grounds for raceconscious measures in areas outside education.").
176. See, e.g., Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354-55
(D.C. Cir. 1998). In Lutheran Church, the court expressed doubt that diversity could
ever serve as a compelling government interest for affirmative action. See id. at 355.
The defendant, the FCC, had argued that the Supreme Court's approval of diversity as a
rationale for an FCC affirmative action plan in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995), had not been expressly overruled. See Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 354. The
Lutheran Church court pointed out, however, that in Metro Broadcasting,diversity was

considered an "important" government interest under an intermediate scrutiny test,
which is easier to satisfy than the compelling interest requirement of strict scrutiny. See
id. The court stated that it did "not think diversity can be elevated to the 'compelling'
level, particularly when the Court has given every indication of wanting to cut back
Metro Broadcasting. In that case, the majority's analysis of the government's 'diversity'
interest seems very much tied to the more forgiving standard of review it adopted." Id.
177. 100 F.3d 1159 (5th Cir. 1996).
178.
179.

See id. at 1163.
See id.

180.
181.

See id. at 1164.
See id. at 1163-64.

The City asserted that the purpose of the transfers and promotions was
to make the police department more representative of the racial makeup
of the city."' The court interpreted this as an attempt to racially balance
the police department, which does not constitute a compelling
government interest under strict scrutiny." 3 Instead, the court stated that,
under Croson, "an affirmative action plan must be narrowly tailored to
remedy past specific instances of discrimination."'' 4 Because the City
was not using the transfers and promotions to remedy past
discrimination, the court held that it did not have a compelling
government interest for its actions."
Similarly, in Covington v. Beaumont Independent School District
(BISD),'86 the court found that maintaining the unitary' status of a
previously desegregated public high school was not a compelling
interest justifying race-conscious reassignment of its coaching staff. '

Shortly after a newspaper article about the lack of African-American
varsity coaches was published, the BISD Board of Trustees ordered that
two non-African-American varsity coaches switch positions with two
African-American sophomore coaches.' 9 The court found that "[o]nce a
school system is integrated, the prior discrimination has been cured and
race-based classifications are thereafter no longer remedial of preunitary violations."'
Because the school district had been declared
unitary, there could be no further remedial actions taken to address preunitary status discrimination. 9 '
The school district also asserted two other interests to justify the
reassignments: (1) the educational benefits of an integrated education for
students;... and (2) the need to provide role models for minority
182. Seeid.atl168.
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. See id. The Fourth Circuit has similarly held that a government entity "must
specify the racial discrimination that it is targeting" when using race-conscious
affirmative action measures. Maryland Troopers Ass'n, Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072,
1076 (4th Cir. 1993).
186. 714 F. Supp. 1402 (E.D. Tex. 1989).
187. Unitary, in this context, refers to a school system which has become
desegregated through the consolidation of two or more segregated school districts in a
geographical area. See id. at 1404. Beaumont, Texas formerly had two coexistent
school districts that racially segregated students: BISD and South Park Independent
School District. See id. at 1404 n.2. After joining to form the single, integrated BISD,
the district court bestowed unitary status, noting "faculty and staff are integrated in every
school in the new BISD." Id. at 1404 n.3.

188.

See id. at 1409.

189.
190.
191.

See id. at 1404-05.
Id. at 1410.
See id.

192. See id. at 1411.

[VOL. 37: 575, 2000]

Affirmative Action
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

members of the athletic teams. 93 The court rejected both of these
interests with little discussion. With respect to the benefits of an
integrated education, the court stated that "[tihe Supreme Court made
clear that states and local subdivisions may constitutionally utilize racial
classifications only to remedy prior discrimination ... ."" According to
the Covington court's application of Croson, any government interest
asserted to justify racial classifications will fail if it does not involve a
remedial purpose.'95 The court rejected the defendant's role model
interest based on Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,'96 in which the

Supreme Court "forcefully denounced" the legitimacy of providing role
models as a justification for affirmative action.'" Because the school
district could provide no evidence of postintegration discrimination to
support a remedial purpose, the reassignments were ruled
unconstitutional.'98
The Covington court is not alone in reading Wygant and Croson as
expressly limiting compelling government interests to remedial situations.
The First Circuit, for example, has concluded that "[t]o date, the
Supreme Court has identified only one goal sufficiently important to
justify the use of affirmative action in public employment: remedying a
governmental body's own past racial discrimination.""' Similarly, in
Long v. City of Saginaw,2w the Sixth Circuit held that without evidence
of discrimination by the City in police department hiring, the City could
not assert a compelling
government interest to justify its affirmative
2
action measures.

01

District courts have generally followed this trend by reading the

2
Supreme Court's decisions narrowly. In Hiller v. County of Suffolk, 02

for example, a federal district court in New York stated that "[a]chieving
diversity is not a sufficiently compelling state interest. Rather, there
must be some 'showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to
193.

See id. at 1413.

194.

Id. at 1412 (emphasis added).

195. See id.
196. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
197. Covington, 714 F. Supp. at 1413.
198. See id.
199. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 19 (1st
Cir. 1998).
200. 911 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1990).
201. See id. at 1196.
202. 977 F. Supp. 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

remedy such discrimination."'

3

In contrast, some courts have left open the possibility that nonremedial
purposes could satisfy the compelling government interest prong of the
strict scrutiny test. In Petit v. City of Chicago,0 4 the defendant-city had

racially standardized the scores of promotional examinations to favor

African-American and Hispanic test-takers. 2 5 The City had also
promoted minority officers with a lower adjusted score than nonminority
officers. 24 The interest asserted for these actions was to avoid a
potential Title VII claim against the City for using test results that had an
adverse impact on African-Americans and Hispanics.2'
The court stated that avoiding a Title VII violation could potentially
be a compelling government interest under the strict scrutiny test.0"
However, the defendant in this case had not provided enough evidence
to support the interest it asserted: if the test was valid as job-related,
there would be no Title VII violation.2 The City had not shown that the
test could not be validated, nor had it shown that the test could not be
redesigned to mitigate its disparate impact.20' Because the defendant's
asserted interest was not supported by evidence, the court refused to
grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment.2 " However, the
court did not reject the possibility that the City could present such
evidence at a later stage, and still assert avoidance of a Title VIE
violation as a compelling justification for using racial standardization.2"2
In Wittmer v. Peters,2 3 the Seventh Circuit held that a nonremedial
purpose based on the operational needs1 of a law enforcement agency
203.
(citations
204.
205.

Id. at 206 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986))
omitted).
31 F. Supp. 2d 604 (N.D. fl1. 1998).
See id. at 606.

206. See id. at 610.
207. See id. at 613-14.

208. See id. "Past discrimination... is not the only possible compelling interest.
Possibly, an attempt to avoid discrimination in violation of Title VII could be another
such compelling interest." Id. (citations omitted).
209. See id. at 614.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. ("Perhaps defendant will be able to show that racial standardization was
justified by a combination of the need to cure past racial discrimination and the impact of
the test.").
213. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
214. The operational needs defense to an Equal Protection claim has been set forth
as showing a compelling government interest by establishing: "(1) that discrimination
against the black community has characterized law enforcement in the past; (2) that this
discrimination has engendered hostility between black community members and the
police; and (3) this hostility has made law enforcement in the community ineffective."
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 327
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). That case involved the race-based transfer of African-American,
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could be a compelling government interest.215 In Wittmer, white
plaintiffs challenged the Illinois Department of Corrections' decision to
promote an African-American officer at a prison boot camp to the
position of lieutenant, even though he ranked forty-second on the

promotional test." 6 The defendant argued that it needed an African-

American authority figure at the boot camp in order to encourage the
African-American inmates to "play the correctional game of brutal drill

sergeant and brutalized recruit 2 7
The Wittmer court stated the strict scrutiny test somewhat differently:
when a public entity employs a racial classification, its action can
survive strict scrutiny only if it demonstrates that such action is
"motivated by a truly powerful and worthy concern and that the racial
measure that they have adopted is a plainly apt response to that
concern.""1 l Such a concern must, nevertheless, be "substantiated and
not merely asserted."219 The defendant substantiated its concern for the

operational needs of the boot camp by providing expert testimony
regarding the need for minority authority figures in the camp." The
plaintiffs did not rebut this testimony with any contrary evidence.2' The
Hispanic, and Haitian officers to the Brooklyn, New York precinct several days after the
Abner Louima incident took place. See id. at 325. Abner Louima, "a black man of
Haitian national origin," was subjected to a severe beating and sexual assault by white
police officers. Id. The City asserted that it made the transfers under exigent
circumstances to "reestablish effective law enforcement after it [had] been impaired by
community hostility" regarding the incident. Id. at 328. The case did not involve an
affirmative action plan or a claim of reverse discrimination. Instead, the AfricanAmerican, Hispanic, and Haitian officers who were transferred challenged it as a racebased action. See id. at 324. The case is still significant, however, because the court
stated that if the City provided evidence to support its asserted interest based on the
operational needs of the police department, it could satisfy the compelling government
interest prong of the strict scrutiny test, even though the race-based action was not
related to any remedial purpose. See id. at 329. "[T]he need for effective law
enforcement can be a compelling state interest. In order to carry out its mission
effectively, a police force must appear to be unbiased, must be respected by the
community it serves and must be able to communicate with the public." Id.
215. See Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920-21.
216. See id. at 917.
217. Id. at 920.

218.

Id. at 918. In Petit v. City of Chicago, 31 F. Supp. 2d 604, 613 (N.D. Ill.

1998), the court applied Wittmer's "truly powerful and worthy concern" standard to find
that avoidance of a Title VII violation could potentially serve as a compelling
government interest supporting affirmative action measures. See supra notes 204-212

and accompanying text.
219. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 918.
220.

See id. at 920.

221.

See id.

court ultimately held that the defendant's promotion of an AfricanAmerican officer over white officers with higher scores was justified by
the operational needs of the boot camp. m
Providing a remedy for past or present discrimination is currently the
only recognized compelling government interest for a public
employment affirmative action plan.
As the above discussion
demonstrates, many lower courts are generally unwilling to accept other
nonremedial justifications, such as providing role models, increasing
diversity, or attempting to racially balance a workplace. The Supreme
Court has not formally approved any other interest as compelling;
however, it has expressly proscribed the use of role models and racial
balancing. Another compelling interest may be emerging in the area of

law enforcement.

Some courts have been willing to accept a

nonremedial purpose for race-conscious action based on the operational
needs of law enforcement. However, in such cases, courts still require
that a public employer provide evidence to prove that the nonremedial
purpose is legitimate. The issue of how much evidence is required to
support a compelling government interest is discussed in greater detail
below.
2. EvidentiaryRequirements of a Compelling Government Interest
In Croson, the Supreme Court stated that a government entity must
have a "strong basis in evidence" to justify the use of race-conscious
affirmative action.2m
The evidence cannot be based on societal
discrimination.' Lower courts have not interpreted this requirement as
establishing a bright line test for the sufficiency of evidence. For
example, the court in Aiken v. City of Memphise stated that "[n]oformal
finding of past discrimination by the governmental unit involved is
necessary to determine that a compelling interest exists, but there must
222. See id at 920-21. Wittmer's standard for determining when an interest is
compelling is consistent with other court decisions dealing with nonremedial purposes
for affirmative action in a law enforcement setting. For example, in Hayes v. North State
Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993), the court did not
summarily reject the defendant's assertion that its police force needed to be racially
diverse in order to be effective. See id. at 213. Instead, the court found that the
defendant had not submitted enough evidence to prove that this was a valid concern. See

id. at 214.
223. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-500 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
224. See id. at 498 ("[A] generalized assertion that there has been past

discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to
determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy" (citing Wygant, 488 U.S. at

275, for the proposition that an ill-defined purpose "has no logical stopping point.")).
225.

37 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir. 1994).
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be 'strong' or 'convincing' evidence of past discrimination by that
governmental unit.''26 This evidence is often presented in one or a
combination of the following forms: statistical evidence, anecdotal
evidence, or prior judicial findings.

A statistical disparity or under-representation of minorities in a public
agency is the most common evidence provided in support of affirmative
action. However, there are restrictions on this type of evidence.
Statistical evidence must be based on a comparison with the percentage
of qualified minorities in the relevant labor pool.= Thus, an appropriate
statistical analysis compares the percentage of minorities working for the
public employer with the percentage of minorities in the applicable
geographic area who possess the skills necessary for the particular job or
promotion.'
A tight statistical comparison ensures that affirmative
action is being taken in response to specific discriminatory events or

effects, and not as a cure for general societal discrimination.2 9

In Long v. City of Saginaw,20 the court rejected a public employer's
statistical evidence of past discrimination because the disparity was

based on a comparison with an inappropriate statistical pool
characterized as "protective services."' The court found the protective
services category to be overinclusive with respect to police officers

because it included a number of irrelevant jobs, such as school bus
monitors, life guards, wildlife control agents, and building security
officers.2'2 The minority availability in the protective service category
226. Id. at 1162-63 (citation omitted).
227. See id. at 1163; see also United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1509
(lth Cir. 1993) ("It is well established that, in determining whether there is a work force
imbalance that justifies affirmative action remedies, the proper comparison is between
the minority composition of the work force in question and the qualified minority
population in the relevant labor market.").
228. See, e.g., Krupa v. New Castle County, 732 F. Supp. 497, 511 (D. Del. 1990).
229. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (plurality opinion). In Croson, the Court rejected
the 30% goal set by the city because it was not based on the number of minority
contractors available in the city. See id. The Court stated that the goal was problematic
because it was based on "the 'completely unrealistic' assumption that minorities will
choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local
population." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 494 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). One might
ask, however, whether the contrary assumption, that a wide statistical disparity can be
explained wholly by a lack of minority interest in certain fields of employment, is any
more valid.
230. 911 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1990).
231. Id. at 1199.
232. See id. at 1200.

was 29%, compared to 7.7% minority police officers in the City's police

department.

3

Instead of basing the comparison on this overinclusive

statistical category, the court held that the City must instead consider
actual job qualifications, such as educational background and physical

fitness.' u

In contrast, the court in Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County did

not require the County's statistical analysis to compare its workforce
with a differentiated labor pool.36 The affirmative action plan at issue
involved a hiring preference for female, African-American, and Hispanic
firefighters." The court found that since the qualifications for entrylevel firefighters did not involve special skills, a valid statistical
comparison need not take into account the particular job requirements."
Based on the wide statistical disparity between Hispanic firefighters and
the general population of Hispanics in the area between the ages of
eighteen and fifty-five, the court held that the County had demonstrated

a compelling government interest to justify its affirmative action plan."
Some courts will find a compelling government interest based on
statistics alone, particularly when the statistical evidence has not been
rebutted by the opposing party.24° For example, in Aiken v. City of
Memphis, 24' the Sixth Circuit found that the City had a compelling
government interest in remedying past discrimination in its police and
fire departments based on a wide statistical disparity. 2 The court first
stated that when strict scrutiny is applied to an affirmative action plan,

233. See id. at 1199.
234. See id.

235. 26 F.3d 1545 (1 th Cir. 1994).
236. See id. at 1554.
237. See id. at 1548.
238. See id. at 1554. The specific requirements for the position were:
(1) possess a high school diploma or its equivalent; (2) possess a driver's
license and have the ability to obtain a chauffeur's license; (3) be at least 18
years old; (4) pass a physical capabilities test; (5) pass a medical examination;
(6) pass a personal interview; (7) have corrected vision in both eyes of at least
20/40.

Id. at 1548.

239. See id. at 1556-57.
240. See id. at 1557. See, e.g., id. at 1555 ("Evidence that the statistical imbalance
between minorities and non-minorities in the relevant work force and available labor
pool constitutes a gross disparity, and thus a prima facie case of a constitutional or
statutory violation, may justify a public employer's adoption of racial or gender
preferences."); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1992)
("Evidence of wide statistical disparities ... may justify an affirmative action policy
adopted by a public employer."); Paganucci v. City of New York, 785 F. Supp. 467, 477
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[A] statistical disparity sufficient to support a prima facie claim under
Title VII provides a firm basis for the implementation of a race-conscious remedy.").
241. 37F.3d 1155 (6thCir. 1994).
242. See id. at 1163.
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"the party defending the plan bears the burden of producing evidence

that the plan is constitutional. The party challenging the plan, however,
retains the ultimate burden of proving its unconstitutionality."24 3 In
Aiken, the City submitted statistics that showed significant disparities in
minority representation among the ranks of the police and fire
departments. 2" The court stated that the plaintiffs had "not offered any
evidence to rebut the inference of discrimination that arises from these
'
statistics."245
According to the court, "the compelling interest inquiry
focuses simply on whether discrimination occurred, not on the precise
extent of any discrimination that did occur."246

However, other courts have held that statistical evidence must be
confirmed by anecdotal or other corroborating evidence.247 In Maryland
Troopers Ass'n, Inc. v. Evans, the court held that the State of Maryland

did not have a compelling government interest supporting its use of
numerical employment goals because it lacked a strong basis in evidence
of past discrimination. 24 The court's primary objection to the
defendant's evidence was that it was purely statistical. 249 "Inferring past
discrimination from statistics alone assumes the most dubious of
conclusions: that the true measure of racial equality is always to be
found in numeric proportionality." ' 0 Because the defendant's statistics
did not amount to a "gross disparity" and they were not corroborated by
anecdotal evidence of discrimination, the court held that the defendant
failed to demonstrate a compelling government interest for using
employment goals."l
Similarly, in Bertoncini v. City of Providence, 2 the court rejected the
243. Id. at 1162.
244. See id. at 1163. In the police department in 1978, 23% of patrol officers were
African-American, but only 7.5% of sergeants, a higher rank, were African-American.
See id. In the fire department in 1979, 14.3% of entry level fire fighters were AfricanAmerican, compared with only 1.1% of African-Americans above that rank. See id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See Maryland Troopers Ass'n, Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (4th Cir.
1993).
248. See id. at 1077.
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 1078-79. Cf McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219,1223-24

(7th Cir. 1998) (stating that raw statistics do not prove intentional discrimination, but
also finding that defendant had presented strong basis in evidence of need to remedy
discrimination, through combination of statistics, anecdotal evidence, and judicial

findings).

252. 767 F. Supp. 1194 (D.R.I. 1991).

defendant's evidence of a statistical disparity between the percentages of

minorities in the general population and in the Providence Fire
Department as insufficient, by itself, to prove past discrimination?" In
contrast to the situation in Maryland Troopers, the disparity in
Bertoncini was severe-six percent of fire fighters were from minority
groups, compared to forty-two percent minority representation in the
general population.2' Furthermore, the City did not require specialized
qualifications for applicants to become fire fighters," supporting the
validity of statistical comparisons to the general population. The court
suggested that alternative explanations could explain the observed
disparity, such as recent immigration of minorities into the area,
although specific evidence for that assertion was not offered. z6 Beyond
defendant's statistical proof, the court found that "the City has been
unable to point to any complaints or findings of such discrimination, and
Fire Department officials expressly deny that the department
discriminates." 7 Indeed, the fire department had been using a voluntary
affirmative action plan for fourteen years and had actively recruited
minority applicants."8 Because there was no evidence to corroborate the
inference of discrimination suggested by the statistical disparity, the
Bertoncini court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of past
discrimination by the fire department. 9
Courts also look to prior judicial findings of discrimination to provide
a strong basis in evidence of the need for remedial action.2 ° In Boston
Police Superior Officers Federationv. City of Boston,6 an affirmative
action plan resulted in the promotion of an African-American who
scored one point less on the promotional test than three white plaintiffs
253. See id. at 1203. Although the court suggested that such statistical evidence
might be sufficient to satisfy Title VII's requirement for demonstrating a "manifest racial
imbalance," it held that it was insufficient to prove the compelling interest necessary
under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 1201-03.
254. See id. at 1203 n.2.
255. See id. at 1196. The Providence Fire Department required only that an
applicant have a high school degree or equivalent and complete a training course to be
eligible to be a fire fighter. See id. Cf. Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d
1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1994), discussed supra note 238. In Peightal, the eligibility

requirements for application to the Dade County Fire Department were essentially the

same as the Providence requirements. See Peightal, 26 F.3d at 1548. However, the
Peightalcourt found that these requirements were not specialized, and comparison to
general population statistics was appropriate. See id.
at 1554.
256. See Bertoncini,767 F. Supp. at 1203.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260.

See generallyStuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 452 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[L]itigated

court findings of recent entry-level discrimination would seem sufficient to justify raceconscious remedies at both entry and promotional levels.").
261. 147 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1998).
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who were not promoted at the same time. 2 In upholding the out-oforder promotion, the court based its finding of a compelling interest on
the history of racial disermiination by the Boston Police Department

previously documented in several First Circuit opinions.2 63 Thus, it may
be easier to convince a court of the compelling state interest at stake in
an affirmative action plan that resulted from a court order or consent
decree, rather than a voluntary
affirmative action plan which is
2
challenged for the first time. "1
Some courts prefer to compare evidence of discrimination with the

level of discrimination found by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Paradise.

In Paradise,the Court examined the validity of an order

requiring the Alabama Department of Public Safety to promote one
African-American trooper for every white trooper promoted until such
time as the Department developed a valid procedure for promotions. 66
The district court had issued the order after the Department delayed
developing valid promotion procedures for eleven years.6 The Supreme
262. See id. at 14.
263. See id. at 20.
264. See, e.g., Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 977 F.2d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1992)
("This Court has already recognized that the manifest imbalance in the fire division with
regard to racial composition justified the 1974 order implementing the decree."); Sims v.
Montgomery County Comm'n, 887 F. Supp. 1479, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 1995) ('The court
hereby adopts the background history of race discrimination in the Sheriff's Department
documented in the memorandum opinions [of the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Alabama].") (citations omitted), aff'd, 119 F.3d 9 (lth Cir. 1997).
But see Freeman v. City of Fayetteville, 971 F. Supp. 971 (E.D.N.C. 1997). In Freeman,
the court noted that the record accompanying an existing consent decree did not include
evidence of discrimination sufficient to meet the compelling government interest

standard. See i. at 975-76. Furthermore, the court would not allow the defendant to

develop additional evidence of discrimination for trial-by that time it was more than
twenty years after the consent decree was entered. See id. at 976. Thus, the defendant
could not demonstrate the strong evidentiary basis required to show a compelling
government interest in support of its affirmative action plan. See id. The result in
Freeman contradicts the recommendation of several constitutional law scholars that, in
the wake of Croson, courts should allow local governments "adequate time to establish
the relevant factual record" needed to respond to a strict scrutiny challenge. Joint
Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALEL.J. 1711, 1714 (1989).
265. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). See, e.g., Bertonciniv. City of Providence, 767 F. Supp.
1194, 1200, 1203 (D.R.I. 1991) (citing Paradise for the proposition that "[i]f a
governmental agency has engaged in deliberate and pervasive discrimination, sweeping
measures may qualify as narrowly tailored to provide the type of remedy required,"
while holding that the statistical evidence presented did not support a finding of such
purposeful discrimination).
266. See Paradise,480 U.S. at 153 (plurality opinion).
267. See id.; see also discussion supraPart II.A.

Court held that there was a compelling interest in granting this relief
because "the pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct
of the Department created a profound need and a firmn justification for

the race-conscious relief ordered by the District Court. ' OS
In Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education,269 the court was
asked to review the constitutionality of a proposed consent decree
settling the discrimination claims of African-American teachers and
administrators in Alabama's postsecondary education system.20 The
decree set numerical hiring goals for African-Americans systemwide and
at various employment levels.27 The decree also specified changes in
recruitment procedures, including the establishment of a recruiting
committee with a minimum of forty percent African-American
membership. 2
In support of a compelling interest, the court
documented the lengthy history of systemic discrimination against
African-Americans and the Board of Education's resistance to
eliminating such discrimination. 73 Following the Supreme Court's lead,
the court found a compelling interest not only in eradicating
discrimination, but also in demanding compliance with previous orders
of the court, stating that "[a]s in Paradise,defendants in this case have
resisted the implementation of both court-ordered and court-approved
relief .... Their resistance provides an additional basis to conclude that
provisions of the decree serve a compelling
the race-conscious
274
purpose.
Race-conscious plans can be affirmed by analogy to Paradise,which
for many courts has become the standard for judging constitutionality.
However, when a court distinguishes the facts of a case from those in
Paradise, an affirmative action plan typically will be found
unconstitutional for lack of a compelling government interest.275 In
268. 480 U.S. at 167 (plurality opinion).
269.

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

846 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1994).

See id. at 1513.
See id. at 1515-16.
See id. at 1516.
See id. at 1522-24.
Id. at 1523-24. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld an affirmative action

consent decree that set goals for hiring minorities and women, finding the facts of the
case to be "strikingly similar" to the facts in Paradise. Davis v. City and County of San
Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1442-44, 1446 (9th Cir. 1989).
275. See, e.g., Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 403 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[O]ur
review clearly indicates that the fact pattern in Paradisedoes not prevail in this case.");
Maryland Troopers Ass'n, Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1078-79 (4th Cir. 1993)
(comparing the "slender reed" of statistical evidence found not to support a compelling
government interest in affirmative action in that case to the specific examples of
continuing discriminatory practice seen in Paradise);Krupa v. New Castle County, 732
F. Supp. 497, 513 (D. Del. 1990) ("The obstinate, systematic, pervasive and exclusionary
discrimination found in Paradiseis simply not present in this case and any statistical
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Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 6 for example, the court
rejected the compelling interest asserted to support the use of out-of-rank
promotions in the Dallas Fire Department.' The City's evidence of past
discrimination included a 1976 consent decree entered upon Department
of Justice findings that the City had violated Title VII, and statistical
analysis showing that minorities were underrepresented in the upper
ranks of the fire department. 8 Without specifying the precise problems
with this evidence, the court dismissed it as minimal. The record was
"devoid of proof of a history of egregious and pervasive discrimination
or resistance to affirmative action that has warranted more serious
measures in other cases." 279 In comparison, the Paradisecourt had found
"'pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct' which

'created a profound need and a firm justification for the race-conscious

relief ordered by the District Court.'

'0

3. Summary
Most courts will not accept as compelling any interest other than
remedying past and present effects of discrimination. Although some

courts have acknowledged a possible exception with respect to the
operational needs of law enforcement, that exception has been expressly
sanctioned by only one circuit court.2I Even where such an exception
applies, the government employer must articulate a strong basis in
evidence that race-conscious measures are necessary to serve that
operational need.

Whenever a public employer develops or implements an affirmative
imbalances that may have existed, if at all pertinent, were being addressed in an ongoing,
good faith successful manner.").
276. 150 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998).
277. See id. at 441.
278. See id.
279. Id. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Dallas Fire FightersAss'n. See 526 U.S. 1046 (1999).
Justice Breyer noted that other courts of appeal had upheld affirmative action plans that
were supported by similar evidence of past discrimination. See id. at 1047. "In light of
the many affirmative-action plans in effect throughout the Nation, the question
presented, concerning the means of proving past discrimination, is an important one; the
lower courts are divided; and the Fifth Circuit's decision may be questionable in light of
our precedents." Id.
280. Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n, 150 F.3d at 441 n.11 (quoting United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987)).
281. See supra notes 213-222 and accompanying text discussing Wittmer v. Peters,
87 F.3d 916, 918, 920-21 (7th Cir. 1996).

action plan, that employer should ensure that it has substantial evidence
to support its asserted purpose-typically to remedy past or present
discrimination. Statistics used by the employer should be based on the
relevant qualified minority work force or from actual applications made
to the agency. In addition, anecdotal evidence should be collected
whenever possible, as the combination of anecdotal and statistical
evidence demonstrates the reality of discrimination more than mere
numbers.
Anecdotal evidence, however, can be difficult to accumulate. In
modem society, overt discrimination is rarely found in the workplace,
thanks in large part to employer and employee education and outreach
programs seeking to foster an inclusive and diverse workplace. In its
place a more invidious form of discrimination, characterized by subtle
prejudice that does not often manifest itself in openly hostile ways, has
come to predominate. Such sophisticated, yet all too real, discrimination
makes for difficult proof. Unfortunately, the strict scrutiny test, as
applied by most of the lower courts here, does not seem to allow
exceptions in that type of subtle case. m

Finally, if any court has made judicial findings of discrimination in the
past, that should be noted. This type of evidence is highly persuasive in
corroborating inferences of discrimination arising from statistical
disparities, and also can be used to show a history of delay on the part of
the employer justifying more rapid and targeted affirmative action.
B. Defining Narrowly TailoredAffirmative Action
The second prong of the Croson strict scrutiny test requires that an
affirmative action plan be narrowly tailored, reaching no further than is
necessary to remedy the specific violation. This prong ensures that the
unavoidable as well as unintentional effects of affirmative action are
minimized. To apply the narrowly tailored prong, lower courts typically
focus on the list of factors elaborated by the Supreme Court in United
3 These factors include "the necessity for the relief
States v. Paradise.2
and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of
the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the
impact of the relief on the rights of third parties. ' " Courts do not treat
282. As one scholar has noted, "[h]eightened proof requirements threaten to leave
unremedied less traceable, but nonetheless pervasive, impacts of discrimination." Lisa
E. Chang, Remedial Purpose and Affirmative Action: FalseLimits and Real Harms, 16
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 59, 60 (1997).
283. 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
284. Id. (plurality opinion).
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the Paradisefactors as individually dispositive; instead, they review the
circumstances of each case and weigh the factors against each other."'

1. Necessity of Relief and Efficacy ofAlternative Remedies
A critical factor in determining whether race-conscious affirmative
action is necessary is the extent to which aojublic employer has
considered less restrictive, race-neutral measures. Race-neutral actions
are essentially efforts to widen the pool of minority applicants for certain
positions without showing preference to those who apply. One of the

most important race-neutral measures a public employer should
implement is a validated selection procedure.7 Validation not only can
avoid race-conscious measures, but also can ensure that procedures are
not inadvertently discriminatory.
In In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment
Litigation,28 nonminority fire fighters challenged a 1981 consent decree

that established an affirmative action plan for promotions within the fire
department.29 According to the decree, fifty percent of the promotions
to lieutenant were given to qualified African-American fire fighters. 20

Although the decree did not have a termination date, it provided that
either party could move for modification or termination after it had been
285. See, e.g., Hiller v. County of Suffolk, 977 F. Supp. 202, 206-07 (E.D.N.Y.
1997). Even though the court found that some Paradisefactors were met, it concluded
that, as a whole, the affirmative action plan was not narrowly tailored. See iL at 207.
286. Some courts have held that unless there is proof that an employer considered
race-neutral alternative measures, the plan cannot be narrowly tailored:

The essence of the 'narrowly tailored' inquiry is the notion that explicit racial
preferences, if available at all, must be only a 'last resort' option. Without
evidence that the City considered race-neutral alternatives to achieve diversity,
or that the use of a non-discriminatory policy would not achieve its goal, we
simply cannot hold that the City's promotion policy was narrowly tailored.
Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir. 1993);

see also Hiller, 977 F. Supp. at 206 ("[Tlhere is no evidence in the record to suggest that

all other alternative measures were evaluated and properly passed over."); Freeman v.

City of Fayetteville, 971 F. Supp. 971, 976 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (terminating existing
consent decree because, inter alia, "there is not any suggestion or indication that the
parties even considered a race-neutral remedy to alleviate the alleged problems .... ").
287. See Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1571 (11th Cir. 1994).
A "validated" procedure is one that meets the standards established by the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission in its Uniform Guidelinesfor Employee Selection

Procedures,29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-1607.14 (1999).
288. 20F.3d 1525 (llth Cir. 1994).
289. See id. at 1530.
290. See id. at 1532.

in effect for six years."' The court held that the consent decree was not
narrowly tailored because there were other measures available to remedy
past discrimination in the fire department.2"
The court reached its conclusion after noting the success of the
department's minority recruiting efforts for entry level hires. 3 The
court stated that "given the City's progress at the entry-level, alternative

measures designed to increase black representation in the fire lieutenant
'
ranks were feasible."294
The court endorsed a number of alternative
measures that could potentially be effective, such as eliminating

seniority points from the promotion rankings, since one effect of past
discrimination was the accumulation of more seniority among white fire
fighters than among African-Americans.295 The City could also ensure

that its promotional test did not have an adverse impact on AfricanAmericans.296 Finally, rather than implementing a plan where race was
the primary factor in awarding fifty percent of the lieutenant promotions,
the City could have adopted a promotion process that considered race as

one of many factors for selection.29

In Ashton v. City of Memphis,298 a federal district court considered

whether Memphis's affirmative action plan for promotions in its police
291. See id.
292. See id. at 1547; accord Alexander v. Estepp, 95 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 1996)
("The program is not narrowly tailored because means less drastic than outright racial
classification were available to department officials.").
293. See Birmingham, 20 F.3d at 1546. In 1974, there were only two AfricanAmerican fire fighters in the department. See id. By 1981, the month before the decree
was entered, the number of African-Americans increased to 42-approximately 9.3% of
the total number of fire fighters. See id. These statistics indicated to the court that
progress was being made in the absence of the drastic race-conscious efforts demanded
by the decree. See id. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See Middleton v.
City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 410-11 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting race-conscious promotion
plan because, inter alia, the City had successfully used "less drastic, alternate ways" to
increase percentage of minority police officers); Krupa v. New Castle County, 732 F.
Supp. 497, 518 (D. Del. 1990) (finding that "the County's recruitment of minorities
actually exceeded minority representation in the area labor force and the eligibility
list.").
294. Birmingham,20 F.3d at 1546.
295. See id. at 1547.
296. See id.
297. See id. In his dissent from the Eleventh Circuit's denial of en bane review of
this case, 60 F.3d 720 (11th Cir. 1994), Judge Hatchett disputed the original panel's

finding that the promotional plan was not narrowly tailored. See id. at 722-23 (Hatchett,
J., dissenting). Judge Hatchett argued the promotional goal was flexible, as
demonstrated by its actual implementation. See id. at 722. Although the goal called for
1:1 promotions of white and African-American fire fighters, in fact the promotion rate
was 60% white and 40% African-American. See iL Judge Hatchett also questioned the
panel's determination that the plan unduly burdened white fire fighters, since their
expectations of promotion were based on an unlawfully discriminatory selection
procedure. See id. at 722-23.
298. 49 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
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department was narrowly tailored. The court held that the plan was
not narrowly tailored because it was not necessary: the City could have
avoided the use of race-conscious measures if it had developed and

implemented a valid nondiscriminatory procedure for promotions, as it
had promised to do in 1979."0 According to the Ashton court, "[h]ad a
validated test been developed, the necessity of using affirmative action
to adjust the order of promotions produced from the results of a nonvalid test would be a moot issue." ''
A potential problem with a strict requirement for using available race-

neutral means is that they may not work fast enough to significantly
impact the lingering effects of discrimination.&2 Some courts have taken

this into account when assessing whether an affirmative action plan is
constitutional. 3" In Howard v. McLucas,3° for example, the court held
that an affirmative action consent decree was narrowly tailored even

299. See id. at 1053. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had already held
that the City had a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination in Aiken v. City
of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir. 1994), and remanded to the district court to
determine whether the plan was narrowly tailored. See Ashton, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
300. See id. at 1060-61.
301. Id. at 1061. In Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, the Eleventh Circuit
similarly held that a twenty-year-old affirmative action consent decree had to be
modified to "put teeth" into the requirement that the defendant Personnel Board develop
valid, nondiscriminatory procedures. See Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d
1548, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994). "Under its present decree, the Board may indefinitely
administer racially discriminatory tests and then attempt to cure the resulting injury to
blacks with race-conscious affirmative action. Federal courts should not tolerate such
institutionalized discrimination." Id. Cf.Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 887 F.
Supp. 1479 (M.D. Ala. 1995). In Sims, the court found that a proposed settlement
agreement which required a one-time promotion of two African-American officers
concurrently with the promotion of two white officers was narrowly tailored, in part
because of a concern that the African-American officers not "be penalized... [for] the
department's failure to fashion new, nondiscriminatory promotion procedures in a timely
manner." Id. at 1488 (holding that the fact that a promotional exam had subsequently
been validated and approved by the court did not preclude use of narrowly tailored raceconscious affirmative action as a remedy for past discrimination in promotions where no
adequate alternative was available).
302. See, e.g., Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1558 (11th Cir.
1994) (finding that race-conscious measures were appropriate since race-neutral
measures had only achieved limited success). But see Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d
396, 411 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Complete reform may not have come overnight, but the
message of both Croson and Paradise is that the complete implementation of such
reform is not a prerequisite to avoiding a quota remedy.").
303. See, e.g., Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d
13, 25 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that one-time affirmative action promotion was narrowly
tailored because race-neutral measures "would not provide a timely remedy").
304. 871F.2d 1000 (1lth Cir. 1989).

619

though other remedial alternatives were available. 5 The decree called6
for 240 promotions of African-Americans in 38 "target" positions.'
African-Americans eligible for promotion to these positions were placed
on a special register, and promotions were made alternately from the
special register and then from a regular eligibility list. 07 Opponents of
the consent decree argued that the promotions should be phased in more
slowly over time.3 The court rejected this argument, stating that
"[tihese alternatives, however, are not feasible because they do not place
the plaintiffs in their rightful place or do not do so expeditiously."
Thus, to satisfy the first Paradisefactor, a local government or public
agency must inquire as to what race-neutral measures are available as an
alternative to race-conscious affirmative action. The success of previous
efforts should first be determined. If race-neutral efforts have been
unsuccessful, or have worked too slowly to achieve meaningful
progress, an employer has a strong reason for implementing raceconscious measures. However, if past or current race-neutral programs
have resulted in significant improvement, a court will likely reject future
race-conscious affirmative action. In either event, an examination of the
available race-neutral remedies is critical, because some courts have
found that the mere lack of inquiry constitutes a failure to satisfy this
Paradisefactor.
2. Flexibilityand Durationof the Relief
Another consideration in the Paradise analysis is whether an
affirmative action plan is sufficiently flexible and temporary in nature to
withstand strict scrutiny. The flexibility factor looks particularly at
whether an affirmative action plan is rigidly applied or more adaptable,
allowing exceptions as needed by changing circumstances. 0 One of the
hallmarks of flexibility in an affirmative action plan is a waiver
provision providing that only qualified persons shall be hired or
promoted, irrespective of their race or the goals of the plan.3 1 Courts
305. See id. at 1009.
306. Id. at 1003.
307. See id.

308.

309.

See id. at 1009.

Id.

310. See Ashton v. City of Memphis, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1063 (W.D. Tenn.
1999).
311.

See Hiller v. County of Suffolk, 977 F. Supp. 202, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The

element of flexibility considers whether a waiver exists when sufficient number of

qualified minorities are not available for hire."); see also Donaghy v. City of Omaha,
933 F.2d 1448, 1461 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding consent decree, pursuant to which Omaha
police department promoted an African-American officer who had greater seniority but
lower test score than competing white sergeant, to be both flexible and valid).
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also look at whether the plan requires a public employer to make
unnecessary promotions in order to meet the plan's goals,3 2 or prohibits
nonminorities from being hired or promoted altogether." 3
For example, a federal district court in Tennessee characterized the
affirmative action plan at issue in Ashton as "highly flexible. 31 4 This
finding was based on the fact that the City was not required to promote
police officers who were not qualified, nor make unnecessary
promotions in order to achieve the plan's goals. 1 5 In Howard, the
Eleventh Circuit also found an affirmative action plan to be sufficiently
flexible under the Paradisestandard. 6 This finding was based on the
following characteristics of the plan: the plan did not prevent white
employees from being promoted; all employees had to satisfy certain
qualification criteria before being promoted; and the plan did not require
unnecessary promotions. 7 "Simply put, the promotional relief does not
constitute blind hiring by the numbers and does not amount to a rigid
'
and impermissible quota system."318
The consent decree approved in Shuford v. Alabama State Board of
Education319 included an additional element of flexibility in its hiring and
promotion goals. 2° Designed to remedy past discrimination in the
Alabama postsecondary educational system,' the decree set hiring and
promotional goals both systemwide and for each individual educational
institution in the system." The court found that the decree was flexible,
312. See Howard,871 F.2d at 1009; Ashton, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
313. See Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 887 F. Supp. 1479, 1488 (M.D.
Ala. 1995) (upholding race-conscious measures that "merely delay the opportunity for

advancement of [nonminorities] not chosen for promotion"), affd, 119 F.3d 9 (1lth Cir.
1997).
314.

Ashton, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. It is interesting to note, however, that even

though the Ashton court found that the plan was highly flexible, it ultimately held that

the plan as a whole was not narrowly tailored because it was not necessary and had

lasted too long. See id. at 1074. Similarly, in Hiller,the court found that a requirement
for all candidates to pass the same examination "met the minimal threshold" for
flexibility, yet the program failed on other grounds including unreasonable duration,
failure to consider race-neutral alternatives, and poor fit of numerical goals to relevant

labor market. See Hiller,977 F. Supp. at 207.
315. See Ashton, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.
316. See Howard,871 F.2d at 1009.
317. See id.
318. Id.
319. 846 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
320. See id. at 1529.
321. See id. at 1513.
322. See id. at 1516. The institutional goals were necessary to prevent the state
from rounding up the systemwide average with hiring at historically African-American

in part because failure to meet these goals would not automatically
violate the decree" 3 Instead, the decree provided that goals could be
modified if they were not reasonably attainable through good faith

efforts. 24 In addition, once an individual institution met its goals, it
would be released from the requirement, even if systemwide goals had
not been met.325
However, courts will often look beyond the language of a particular

decree or plan to determine whether these elements of flexibility are
actually put into practice. In Middleton v. City of Flint,326 for example,
the court rejected the City's argument that its affirmative action plan was
flexible because it included a waiver when qualified minorities were
unavailable.327 Although the plan characterized its goals as "flexible

targets... [that] shall not result in unqualified persons being appointed"
rather than "quotas or rigid standards," the court found these words to be
"merely conclusory assertions."'3 In reality, the plan did little more than
pay lip service to flexibility concerns because the City actually awarded

bonus points to all test-takers in certain years in order to give minority
candidates qualifying scores.329

Affirmative action plans that operate on a "one-time" basis are more

likely to be considered flexible due to the temporary nature of their
relief.33 Rather than setting goals that must be met over time through

institutions while historically white institutions ignored the problem. See id.
323. See id. at 1529. The goals were not intended to be quotas, nor was it necessary
to hire an unqualified person. See id. The court interpreted Supreme Court rulings as
"more favorably disposed toward hiring goals [than quotas] ...[because] 'hiring goals
impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities."' Id.
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986)).
324. See id. at 1530.
325. See id.
326. 92 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1996).
327. See id. at411.
328. Id.
329. See id. ("This flexibility with grading destroys the city's claim that its plan
flexibly waives the 1:1 requirement so that it shall not result in unqualified persons being
appointed to positions.") (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Ensley Branch,

NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1576 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that affimnative action
goals operated as rigid quotas, particularly in light of specific instances where
unqualified minorities were promoted in order to meet the plan's goals). Cf.Peightal v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1559 n.21 (1lth Cir. 1994) ('The hiring goals
in 1983 were not rigidly applied, as is evident from the presence of numerous minority
applicants who did not receive employment offers, despite the Department's failure to
meet its goals.").
330. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 996 F. Supp. 1118, 1127
(M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that "short-lived," one time remedial provision in consent
decree was narrowly tailored); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 887 F. Supp.
1479, 1488 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (finding that promotional relief provided in a settlement
agreement was flexible because it was a "one-time measure," responsive to an immediate
need that arose while race-neutral procedures were being developed).
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the general hiring and promotion processes, one-time plans establish a
specific number of promotions or hires that must be
31 made over a
prescribed period of time to remedy past discrimination.
Courts also look at the duration of an affirmative action plan as an
indicator of flexibility. 332 There is no bright-line test for when the
duration of a plan becomes unreasonable.33' One court has noted that
"[a] consent decree may appropriately be used to remedy past
discrimination, but it may not be used to achieve and maintain racial
balance. The longer a consent decree334remains in effect, the more it
appears to belong in the latter category."
Providing for a means to terminate the plan or consent decree once its
goals have been accomplished is one way to make the duration of
affirmative action more narrowly tailored. For example, in Davis v. City
and County of San Francisco,35 the court modified an affirmative action

consent decree that was set to last seven years by requiring that the term
be "seven years or sooner upon the accomplishment of the objectives or
331. See, e.g., Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000 (11th Cir. 1989). In Howard,
the court approved a consent decree that set aside 240 promotions to be awarded to
qualified African-Americans as a remedy for past discrimination. See id. at 1003. The
promotions were to be awarded in 38 target positions and alternated with general
promotions, preserving promotion opportunities for non-African-American employees.
See id. The court found the plan to be sufficiently flexible, particularly since it set no
numerical goals, did not seek to racially balance the workplace, and ended once the
promotions were made. See id. at 1009.
332. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 989 F.2d 225, 228 (6th Cir. 1993)
("Limiting the duration of a race-conscious remedy which clearly impacts adversely
upon the plaintiffs is a keystone of a narrowly tailored plan .... ").
333. See, e.g., Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 411-12 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding that a race-conscious plan was not flexible because it lasted ten years); Jansen v.
City of Cincinnati, 977 F.2d 238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1992) (reversing dissolution of
consent decree that had been in place for eighteen years and further suggesting that if the
goals of a consent decree have not been met it could rightfully remain in effect
indefinitely); Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448, 1461 (8th Cir. 1991)
(approving limited duration of seven years); Hiller v. County of Suffolk, 977 F. Supp.
202, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that nine years is an unreasonable duration for an

affirmative action plan); Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 846 F. Supp. 1511,
1529 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (holding that a seven-year plan is "sufficiently temporary" to
meet the flexibility requirement because it is not "an attempt to maintain racial balance
in perpetuity").
334. Ashton v. City of Memphis, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1065-66 (W.D. Tenn. 1999)
(citations omitted). In Ashton, the court found that the consent decree was not narrowly
tailored because it had been in effect for 14 years, yet during that time, the City had
never attempted to develop a validated procedure for promotions, which could have
ended affirmative action. See id. at 1067.
335. 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989).

'
the goals of the consent decree."336

Similarly, in Peightal v.

Metropolitan Dade County,337 the court found that an affirmative action
plan was reasonable and limited in duration because it provided for
termination once the County's seventy percent hiring goal was
reached. 38 An additional factor contributing to the reasonableness of its
duration was a requirement that the county reevaluate the plan's goals on
an annual basis. 39
In sum, the hallmark of a flexible affirmative action plan is a waiver
provision stating that an employer is not required to hire or promote
unqualified minorities. Many courts will look for such a provision when
reviewing a written affirmative action plan or consent decree, and also
examine whether it was actually used in practice. If a public employer
lowers the threshold qualifications for hiring or promotion, a court will
most likely find the waiver provision to be irrelevant, because it is not
enforced in practice. In addition to a waiver provision, a public
employer using affirmative action should be careful to avoid
unnecessary hires or promotions, while at the same time avoiding the
preclusion of the hiring or promoting of nonminority employees during
the term of the plan.
The duration of an affirmative action plan is also an important
consideration under Paradise. One-time relief is often favored, because
it does not require ongoing goals or court monitoring, and there is a
definite end to the relief. However, if goals are necessary, a public
employer should set a date certain in the future for terminating the plan,
provided the goals have been met. The goals themselves should be
subject to review on a periodic basis to ensure continuing reasonableness
and close ties to remedying discrimination. The consent decree in
Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education,3 for example, provided
that goals set in the decree could be adjusted if they were not reasonably
attainable through good faith efforts, thereby adding another layer of
flexibility to an otherwise narrowly tailored plan.

336. Id. at 1448.

337. 26 F.3d 1545 (1lth Cir. 1994).
338. See id. at 1559.
339. See id. ("'[T]he plan is remedial in nature, and it addresses problems of underutilization. If they don't exist, then there is no need to set a goal."') (quoting testimony
of Jacquelyn Rowe, former Director of the Fire Department's Affirmative Action
Office). Cf. Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 217
(4th Cir. 1993) ("The City has offered no evidence regarding the duration of its use of
racial preferences. Furthermore, it has offered no evidence indicating that the City
regularly reevaluates its use of racial preferences to insure that such preferences continue
to be justified by some compelling state interest.").
340. See supranotes 319-26 and accompanying text.
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3. RelationshipBetween Goals and Relevant LaborMarket
The Paradiseanalysis also requires a court to examine the relationship
between the goals established by the affirmative action plan and the
relevant labor market. This factor is similar to the evidentiary

requirements for proving past discrimination."' If minority employment
goals are not based on the percentage of qualified minorities in the
relevant labor market, this Paradisefactor is not met and the plan will

most likely not pass strict scrutiny. 2 Instead, the statistical basis used to
establish goals must consider the number of persons in the labor force

who possess the requisite qualifications for the job. 3
In Shuford v. Alabama State Board of Education,"' however, the court
approved a consent decree with goals that only approximated the
relevant labor market."5 The plaintiffs in Shuford, African-American

employees in Alabama's post-secondary education system, could not
precisely define the relevant labor market because the defendant had
never established objective qualifications for the disputed positions."'

Without a description of these qualifications, the court could not
determine the true percentage of African-Americans in the relevant labor
market who possessed the necessary skills for these jobs. 7 In setting a
341. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
342. See Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 412 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the plan at issue was not narrowly tailored, in part because the court could find no

relationship between the 41.5% goal and the relevant labor market); Ensley Branch,
NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1577 (1lth Cir. 1994) (remanding consent decree to
the district court for modification of goals to align them with the proportion of qualified
African-Americans in the labor pool); In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525, 1549 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding there was "no
relationship between the numerical goal for fire lieutenant promotions and the
representation of blacks among firefighters"); Freeman v. City of Fayetteville, 971 F.
Supp. 971, 976 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that plan imposing race-based hiring quotas
was not narrowly tailored because there was no explanation for the percentages used to
set goals); Bertoncini v. City of Providence, 767 F. Supp. 1194, 1203 (D.R.I. 1991)
(rejecting goals of affirmative action plan because they were not based on any particular
findings, but rather were selected by default because they had been used in the past).
343. See, e.g., Hiller v. County of Suffolk, 977 F. Supp. 202, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
("[The figures utilized reflected the minority percentage of the general population ....
There are additional educational, physical, medical, psychological and background
requirements that were not considered, and therefore, the statistics provided have little
probative value.").
344. 846 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
345. See id. at 1530.
346. See id.
347. See id. ("[Ihe court cannot say conclusively that the goals represent that
number of available and qualified African-Americans who would have been employed in

25% goal, the Shuford court considered the actual 15.1 to 22.2%

African-American representation underinclusive because it had been
The goal was
achieved under the existing discriminatory system."
approved, despite the lack of relevant labor market comparisons,

because, under the terms of the consent decree, the goal could be
changed once
the defendant developed suitable criteria for these
9
positions."
However, in Aiken v. City of Memphis,35 the Sixth Circuit remanded

the case back to the district court to reconsider whether an affirmative
action plan for police officer promotions was narrowly tailored?5' The
appellate court found that promotion goals set by the consent decree
were problematic, because they were tied to goals for hiring AfricanAmerican officers which were, in turn, based on the minority population
in the undifferentiated labor force. 52 According to the court, this caused
a

"ripple

effect,"

potentially

making

the

promotion

goals

unconstitutional since they were piggybacked onto undifferentiated
statistics. 53 The court stated that on remand:
[T]he [district] court should ascertain as best it can the racial makeup of the
qualified labor pool for the positions at issue, so that it can determine whether
the decrees' hiring and promotion goals have caused black representation in the
that representation would have been if
relevant higher ranks to be greater than
3
no discrimination had ever occurred. -

When affirmative action plans do not include the use of goals, this
element of the Paradise analysis looks at whether the plan is
3 55
In Alexander v. Estepp,35 6 for
overinclusive or underinclusive.

example, the court held that an affirmative action hiring plan was not
narrowly tailored because it benefitted minorities, including Hispanics
and South Asians, who had not suffered from past discrimination by the

the covered positions by 1999 in the absence of racial discrimination.").
348. See id.
349. See id. at 1531 (concluding that the "proposed decree has built-in mechanisms
to ensure that the goals become narrowly tailored to the relevant labor pool, if they are
not already so, and remain narrowly tailored throughout the life of the decree").
350. 37 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir. 1994).
351. See id. at 1167.
352. See id. at 1165.
353. See id.
354. Id. at 1167. On remand, the district court held that the plan was not narrowly
tailored. See Ashton v. City of Memphis, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1074 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
355. See Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 996 F. Supp. 1118, 1128 (M.D.
Ala. 1998) (affirming constitutionality of affirmative action plan that did not include
goals, but was neither underinclusive nor overinclusive because it applied only to a small
group of African-Americans).
356. 95 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 1996).
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County.357 The Estepp court concluded that, "failure to match particular
racial or ethnic preferences with particular acts of discrimination against
particular racial or ethnic groups also shows that the program as
currently structured is not narrowly tailored."35 S
In Black Fire FightersAss'n v. City of Dallas,359 the court similarly
rejected a proposed consent decree that failed to specifically identify
victims of past discrimination. 6 In that case, the consent decree called
for out-of-rank or "skip" promotions as a remedy for past discrimination
against African-Americans in the fire department.3 6' The court found
that since a separate provision of the consent decree awarded damages to
some of the plaintiffs, the specific victims of discrimination could be
identified.362 Considering this, the court stated that "[t]he broad skip
promotion remedy in the decree is difficult to justify when the

knowledge to narrow it seems readily available."3
The relevant labor market factor is related to the evidentiary
requirements for demonstrating a compelling government interest.
When goals are used in an affirmative action plan, they must be tied to
the minority population in the relevant labor market. In order to define
the relevant labor market, a public employer must determine what
percentage of minorities possesses the required qualifications for the
position at issue. For promotions, this is often the percentage of
minorities who are eligible to take the promotional test. For hiring, the
appropriate goal is the qualified minority population in the pertinent
geographic area. If the job requires only minimum qualifications, such
as a high school education or equivalent and a drivers' license, goals
may be based on general or undifferentiated population statistics. Not

357. See id. at 316. The County had only provided evidence of past discrimination
toward African-Americans. See id.
358. Id. at 316. Cf.Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448, 1460 (8th Cir.
1991) (holding that consent decree was not overinclusive, because it applied only to
African-Americans, who were the only underutilized minority group that had been
identified). When the actual individuals who suffered discrimination can be identified
and remediated directly, a court will typically find narrow tailoring. See, e.g., Paganucci
v. City of New York, 785 F. Supp. 467, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The only beneficiaries of
the settlement are the minority officers who were affected by the examination's disparate
impact, and thus the settlement is not overinclusive.").
359. 19 F.3d 992 (5th Cir. 1994).
360. See id. at 994-95.
361. Id.
362. See id.

363. Id. at 995.

all courts, however, have agreed with this approach.3
Where goals are not involved, a court will still look at whether the

affirmative action plan is under- or overinclusive. When victims of
discrimination can be identified or have been identified for other
purposes, such as payment of damages, the relief should focus on those
identified as victims. If, as is typically the case, specific victims cannot

be ascertained, a public employer should be careful to match the relief to
the minority groups for which it has evidence of discrimination. For
example, if all evidence of past discrimination focuses on AfricanAmericans, an affirmative action plan for Hispanics may be seen as
overinclusive. Essentially, this factor calls for a tight fit between the
discrimination asserted and the relief granted.
4. Impact on ThirdParties

The final Paradisefactor looks at how the affirmative action plan at
issue impacts the rights of third parties. Courts tend to view such impact
on a continuum, depending on the type of employment action involved.

For example, the impact of a racial preference for a promotion is not as
harsh as the impact of a racial preference for a layoff decision."'
Preferences in hiring may have even less impact on third parties than
promotions." Some courts, however, have found the impact of both
promotional and hiring preferences to be "relatively diffuse,"
particularly when the plan does not prohibit nonminorities from being
promoted or hired altogether. 67
364. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
365. See Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1561 (11th Cir.
1994) ("Denial of a future employment opportunity [is] not as intrusive as loss of an
existing job." (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986))); see
also Ashton v. City of Memphis, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1073 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) ("[Llost
promotions are not as burdensome as the loss of an existing job."). But see Middleton v.
City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 413 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that even promotional
preferences had "drastically" affected the rights of third parties by denying them "salary
increases, increased pensions, and related benefits, as well as the opportunity to accrue
seniority to gain subsequent promotions.").
366. See Ashton, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 ("Unlike the use of affirmative action in
initial hiring where the burden is diffused among the relevant labor force, the potential
impact of race-based promotions here is limited to the pool of qualified white patrol
officers who might be passed over for promotion.").
367. See Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 846 F. Supp. 1511, 1531 (M.D.
Ala. 1994) ("At the very worst, some white applicants' attempts to be hired or promoted
will be delayed."); see also Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000, 1009-10 (11th Cir.
1989). But see In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d
1525, 1549 (1lth Cir. 1994). The Birmingham court distinguished Howard because in
Howard a targeted number of promotions were spread out over thirty-eight different
positions. See id. In Birmingham, however, the promotions only affected one position
and were to continue until the goals of the consent decree were met, thus creating a

628
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In Boston Police Superior Officers Federationv. City of Boston,3 6 the
court looked at the legitimacy and reasonableness of the expectations of
third parties affected by affirmative action. 69 The court pointed out that

the plaintiffs' expectations "could not have been overly firm,'"
considering there were more candidates than positions for the promotion

at issue, and there was no state law right to promotion for civil
servants.37

Furthermore, the plaintiffs remained eligible for future

promotions.372
In Black Fire FightersAss'n v. City of Dallas,373 however, the impact
of an affirmative action consent decree on third parties was too great to
meet narrow tailoring requirements. 374 The consent decree called for out-

of-rank promotions that the court recognized as having a less severe
impact than being laid off.375 However, the court's analysis focused
primarily on the expectations of the third parties, rather than the nature
of the affirmative action: "[s]o long as the department ranks its

employees' exam scores, however, a firefighter has an expectation that
he can earn promotion through study.

That expectation is tangible

enough that we cannot ignore the problems with the tailoring of this
remedy. 376
In Ashton v. City of Memphis,3" the court found that out-of-rank

bottleneck at the position of lieutenant for nonminorities wishing to move up in the
ranks. See id. Cf Hiller v. County of Suffolk, 977 F. Supp. 202, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
In Hiller, even though the court found that the impact on third parties was "attenuated
and diffused," it still held that the affirmative action plan was not narrowly tailored
based on a balancing of all the Paradisefactors. Id.
368. 147 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1998).
369. See id. at 24.

370. Id.
371.

See id.

372. See id. In looking at the effect on third parties, courts also consider whether
hiring and promotion procedures provide a legitimate and reasonable basis for third party
expectation. Included in this inquiry is the validity of an examination with respect to
requirements for a particular job as well as race-neutral impact. See, e.g., Peightal v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1562 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Given the test's
unreliability and its adverse impact on minorities, we cannot say that Peightal should be
entitled to relief based upon the rigid rank-ordering produced from such a flawed
examination or that Metro Dade's departure from these rankings placed an undue onus
upon Peightal.").

373. 19 F.3d 992 (5th Cir. 1994).
374. See id. at 997.
375.

See id.

377.

49 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).

376. Id.

promotions subjected plaintiffs to a "relatively light impact." 3" The
impact was less than it would have been had affirmative action involved
layoffs rather than promotions." 9 However, by focusing on a small
group of individuals-white patrol officers eligible for promotion who
ranked higher than those officers who were actually promoted-the
impact was heightened.38 Regarding the plaintiffs' expectations, the
court acknowledged that if seniority had not been factored into the
ranking, several plaintiffs would not have had high enough ranks for
promotion."' The court stated that:
It can be assumed that the white officers' greater experience stems, at least in
part, from the identified prior discrimination in the MPD against hiring
blacks.... Thus, it is difficult to find these plaintiffs were greatly impacted
through the use of affirmative action when, but for their greater seniority points
due in part to prior discrimination by the MPD, they would not
3 2 have ranked
high enough to be promoted absent the use of affirmative action.

Nevertheless, after considering all of the Paradisefactors, the Ashton
court ultimately held that the affirmative action plan could not survive
strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored 3
Typically, this final Paradise factor focuses on the impact of raceconscious relief on third parties in light of what their reasonable
expectations are or should be. Courts generally agree that hiring
preferences are less detrimental than promotions, which are in turn less
detrimental than layoffs. However, one court's unbearable impact is
often tolerable to another. In the end, this may be the least significant
factor. Affirmative action plans that satisfy the other factors will most
likely be found narrowly tailored regardless of their impact on third
parties. Likewise, where a plan fails to meet the previous Paradise
factors, the fact that its impact on third parties is not overly burdensome
will probably not save it in the end.
C. Recommendationsfor Practitionersand Summary
In general, the strict scrutiny test operates on a sliding scale. With a
strong compelling interest, a public employer will have more flexibility
378. Id. at 1074.
379. See id. at 1073.
380. See id. at 1074.
381. See id. at 1073 n.29. Other courts have also recognized the problems
associated with factoring seniority into promotional procedures. See, e.g., Boston Police
Superior Officers Fed'n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The effect
of prior discrimination was compounded by the fact that experience makes up twenty
percent of the score assigned to a candidate for promotion... negatively impact[ing]
black.., candidates.").
382. Ashton, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 n.29.
383. See id. at 1074.
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under the narrowly tailored prong to develop an aggressive affirmative
action plan.
By contrast, if the evidence of past or present
discrimination is weak or minimal, an affirmative action plan that
employs race-conscious measures will be unlikely to survive the
narrowly tailored analysis. Public employers should thus examine the
extent of past or present discrimination as a first step in developing an
affirmative action program. The employer's options regarding which
techniques and methods to implement depend on this determination.
In order to survive the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny
test, public employers should consider the following questions when
formulating an affirmative action plan:3"
1. Have alternate remedies been considered or implemented?
Were they successful?
2. Have the testing procedures used been validated according to
EEOC Guidelines?
3. Does the plan include a waiver provision that excuses the
employer from hiring or promoting unqualified persons?
4. Is there a specific termination date for the plan? Can the plan

be terminated at an earlier date if its objectives are met?
5. If the plan includes numerical goals, are the goals based on
the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant labor
market? Does the plan call for regular review of these goals?
6. Is the plan overinclusive or underinclusive? Does it benefit
all minorities, or only those minority groups that have been
found to suffer from discrimination?
7. What burden does the plan place on third parties? Does the
plan prohibit third parties from being promoted or hired, or
cause them to be laid off?
Taken together, the two prongs of strict scrutiny, as currently applied
by the federal courts, present a daunting challenge to the employer or
government actor who seeks to apply affirmative, race-conscious action
in hiring or promotion. The employer must first be prepared to bear the
full burden of proving and defending a compelling interest. Good
384.

For further guidance, see Walter Dellinger, Justice DepartmentMemorandum

on Supreme Court's Adarand Decision, 1995 DALY LAB. REP. 125 d33 (June 29, 1995),
which lists a number of additional questions that the Department of Justice has instructed
federal agencies to ask when reviewing the constitutionality of existing affirmative

action plans.

Thus, the perceptive employer's
intentions are not enough.
acknowledgment of the benefits of a culturally diverse work force, if
such diversity relies on the recognition of race as a criteria for achieving
diversity, not only will fail but will likely lead to counter-challenges of
racism. Even the less-than-altruistic employer seeking simply to comply
with statutory antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII must tread
carefully lest its compelling interest in self-preservation lead to its
ultimate downfall.
For all intents and purposes, employers implementing voluntary
affirmative action must be prepared to prove that they have purposefully
discriminated on the basis of race. Not only does such a burden place
employers in the awkward position of documenting and coming forward
with substantial evidence of their own past wrongdoing, but a court is
likely to look with skepticism at such admissions. A simple showing of
a statistical disparity is insufficient proof of past discrimination, since
the majority of courts have accepted the mere suggestion of any
plausible alternative explanation for such a disparity. No longer can
employers count on logic and reason to save them. For the courts,
following the lead of the Supreme Court, have turned a blind eye to the
reasonable inference that if it looks like discrimination, and smells like

discrimination, it most probably is discrimination. Thus, employers are
faced with demonstrating that they intentionally, specifically, and
perhaps even systematically violated the law. Such a burden has
undoubtedly chilled all but the most conscientious volunteers." 5
Employers convinced that they have a compelling interest-indeed
duty-to remedy past discrimination must then set aside any lofty
notions of lifting minorities up to make amends for past discrimination,
replacing their altruism with caution, control, and deliberation. Restraint
is clearly the key word for narrow tailoring. Should employers decide to
proceed against all current odds, they do so at substantial personal risk.
Should they falter in their uncertain attempts to do the right thing, they
face not only the cost, inconvenience, and embarrassment of court
intervention, but potential personal liability as well. At least one Circuit
has held that a government actor may not be protected by the shield of

385. See Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2
MICH. J. RACE & L. 51 (1996).

The Court's ambivalence about the permissible use of race-conscious remedies
has frustrated good-faith efforts by government at all levels to investigate and
voluntarily rectify both historic and continuing problems of racial and gender
discrimination. Many state and local agencies that want to implement
voluntary plans have no clear, definitive guidance from the Court on what is
required to satisfy strict scrutiny.

Id. at 88.
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his office if he should have known his actions were unconstitutional.S6
Given the Court's diverse measurements, it is difficult to know whether
the suit fits!
The scenario employers face today might be appropriate for a society
that has achieved the goal of true color-blindness. But in our less-thanperfect world, it seems more suited to promoting indifference-not
acceptance. Is this truly what the Supreme Court had in mind when it
proclaimed strict scrutiny? Is this all that remains of affirmative action?
Is there a better way? This Article suggests below that there is.
IV. CONCLUSION

So, has affirmative action been negated? A review of the lower court
cases demonstrates that strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, fatal in
fact" with respect to affirmative action. A small window of opportunity
still remains, but the view through that window provides visions of both
hope and gloom. To a large extent the need for affirmative action has
diminished. The laws of discrimination are being enforced. Employers

have become more aware and more sensitive. Training and education
are directed at avoiding discrimination and harassment in the workplace.
Progess has been made in hiring and promotions.
But with that new awareness comes discrimination which is more
sophisticated. The former, blatant discrimination has been replaced by a
more subtle form which is more difficult to prove. Likewise, things that
we all assume to be true may not meet the current standards of proof and
the definition of a "compelling government interest." The Supreme
Court requires that public employers have a "strong basis in evidence" in
order to use affirmative action to remedy past or present discrimination.
In order to provide consistency among lower courts, the Supreme Court
should further articulate the evidentiary standard for a compelling
government interest. If a significant statistical disparity exists, those
data alone should be sufficient to create an inference of discrimination,

386. See Alexander v. Estepp, 95 F.3d 312, 317-18 (4th Cir. 1996). In Alexander,
the court held that the Croson decision, as well as two other decisions from the Fourth
Circuit, should have put the defendants on notice that the affirmative action plan at issue
would be subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at 317-18. The court stated that "the
individual defendants have not established their entitlement to qualified immunity
because case law (about which a reasonable official would have known) had clearly
established by 1993 and 1994 that the department's affirmative action program failed to
satisfy the strict requirements of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 318.

enough to justify the development of affirmative action measures.
Under this "inferential" standard, a statistical disparity that proves a
prime facie case under Title VII would be sufficient to constitute a
compelling government interest.
The Supreme Court expressed concern that if societal discrimination
could be the basis for specific affirmative action, there would be "no
logical stopping point" for affirmative action. The inferential standard
proposed here, however, satisfies this concern because a compelling
government interest is only one prong of the strict scrutiny test. Under
the narrowly tailored prong, a public employer is required to go beyond
demonstrating that discrimination has occurred and must also justify the
specific actions it has taken in response. Public employers must still
demonstrate that they have considered race-neutral alternatives, and that
those alternatives would not be effective to remedy the effects of the past
discrimination at hand. A narrowly tailored affirmative action plan must
also be flexible and limited in duration. The impact on third parties
must be weighed against the benefits of the affirmative action plan. All
of these safeguards ensure that affirmative action does have a logical
stopping point-when facts giving rise to the inference of discrimination
no longer exist.
As the forms of discrimination in the workplace and in society become
increasingly subtle, a high evidentiary standard essentially becomes the
death-knell to affirmative action and precludes public employers from
taking action to avoid perpetuating the status quo. Coupled with the
requirements of narrow tailoring, the inferential standard for a
compelling government interest allows flexibility on the part of
employers while providing a measuring stick of fairness for all parties
affected by affirmative action.
Furthermore, the inferential standard may be a means to address the
contribution the State itself has made in creating and perpetuating the
situation characterized as "societal discrimination." As Justice Kennedy
said in his concurring opinion in Croson, "the State has the power to
eradicate racial discrimination and its effects in both the public and
private sectors, and the absolute duty to do so where those wrongs were
caused intentionally by the State itself."3 ' Yet the lingering effects of
state-sponsored discrimination are not so easily eradicated. AfricanAmericans face a continuing struggle toward parity in such essential
state-controlled facets of life as education, housing, transportation, and
indeed even access to justice. The Supreme Court has, at worst, been
unwilling to acknowledge such effects and, at best, been unable to
387. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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devise an easily quantifiable formula to address them with affirmative
action.
Although an imperfect measure, the inferential standard could be
appropriately applied to incorporate the degree to which governmental
discrimination has contributed to minority unavailability in the
workforce due to cumulative loss of opportunity, for example, in
Such an explanation for statistical
education and transportation.
disparities is at least as compelling as the argument that minorities
simply choose not to enter a desirable job market.
In addition to establishing the inferential standard, the Supreme Court
should also explicitly define the part that diversity, role model, and
operational needs rationales may play in developing an affirmative
action plan. Can there be any doubt as to the need and efficacy of
having African-American police officers serving on the streets of
African-American neighborhoods, or having African-American teachers
inspiring African-American children? No experience can do more to
eradicate prejudice than to have college students of all races living and
working side by side. No course on the evils of discrimination can
match the educational value of a white student having an AfricanAmerican as a close personal friend or roommate. A diverse workplace
makes people more aware and tolerant of other races and cultures.

But the benefits of diversity and appropriate role models have not
been recognized by the courts and may not be susceptible of easy proof
despite our assumptions. To limit affirmative action to only those
instances where there is clear proof of past discrimination is to ignore
the harm that can be eradicated, the benefits that can be achieved, and
the realities that exist.
If the reasons and bases for allowing affirmative action were
expanded, we have little quarrel with the concept of having such
programs "narrowly tailored"--doing no more than what is necessary to
accomplish the goals set forth above. But the efforts to bar or eliminate
affirmative action programs, particularly those programs voluntarily
undertaken, deprive the nation of a significant means of ending
discrimination and affording opportunity to those who need and deserve
Although, admittedly, affirmative action has some adverse
it.
True,
consequences, its benefits far outweigh its detriments.
contribution by those so affected is essential, but they cannot avail
themselves of opportunities that do not exist. The "level playing field"
is still a steep climb for far too many.

636

